| ▲ | neobrain 17 hours ago | |||||||
> Security should be enforced outside the harness with a sandbox. You can define what's allowed and what's not in one place and have strong enforcement guarantees instead of ad-hoc permission requests every minute. I agree in principle, but in practice most sandboxing technology (like bwrap) is too static for this use case: You grant access once during startup and can't extend/revoke without a restart. That's inconvenient when you realize halfway through your session that you need additional permissions, and it's insufficient for permissions that are only briefly needed (for the duration of one tool call). A harness that controls the sandbox (e.g. for each individual tool invocation) can manage this much more effectively. | ||||||||
| ▲ | jeremyjh 13 hours ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||
I almost never have to extend permissions of my sandbox. By default it can read/write the project tree, and read most files on the machine with specific secret locations excluded. If I do have to expand permissions and restart, I just resume the session. | ||||||||
| ▲ | s1ugh34d_ 16 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | |||||||
A harness that controls the sandbox is exactly what I’m after. Tools don’t always need to share the same space, and I can isolate work much better if separate toolchains are isolated in sandboxes. My biggest gripe with the major harnesses is how they sandbox tool calls. | ||||||||
| ▲ | or1gaminal 11 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||
Offtop: "I agree in principle, but in practice..." do you listen to The Rest is History podcast? I just heard this line for the first time in this episode https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QIGseLdLk0 and now it props up second time on the same day! | ||||||||
| ||||||||