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▲ rpunkfu 18 hours ago

Security when calling external services is much more than just FS permissions, sandbox doesn’t protect at all what you push to github or call API with

▲ghosty141 18 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Doesn't change his argument that sandboxing should be done outside the harness. You can also handle network access etc externally.

▲testtestmetest 14 hours ago | parent [-]

You really wanting handle this at the sanbox layer? I have 100 different containers configurations, only a few differnet harness configurations.

You're just being stubborn, the best UX is through the harness. Most users dont even know how to configure a sandbox properly and dont even use one.

Ive known quite a few naive people that have gotten their home directories wiped and really gotten burned. Many users of these products dont even know how to use a terminal and these harness companies are marketing to the average joe.

▲krzyk 13 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> Most users dont even know how to configure a sandbox properly and dont even use one.

This is their problem. But running and screaming "ai deleted my database" is all on them, not on LLM.

▲ghosty141 14 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I have a sandbox script and a simple wrapper that runs any command in that sandbox thus that "pi" -> without sandbox, "pisb" -> pi in the sandbox. I practically only use pisb.

This separation doesn't mean it must result in bad UX. It just needs somebody to make a nice UI/TUI to configure the sandbox and when running that it does its setup and open whatever command you want.

The problem with the harness doing sandboxing is that from my experience the simply break all the time leading to users ignoring properly configuring it and using abominations like codex' `Approve for me` where IT ASKS A SEPARATE AI and not the user.

▲testtestmetest 13 hours ago | parent [-]

My main issue is these are being marketed to average joes. You wont see anything on these harnesses documentation, opencode et al, who say it should be used in a sandbox. The people making them, opencode et al, scream everyday about how you're holding yourself back by using permissions without a single mention of sandbox.

Hundreds of thousands of people are using them naively, if they shipped with common sense strictish permissions instead of none at all, like what opencode opted to do it would be safer for everyone. Its much easier for a normal non programmer to configure a simple config file than it is for them to learn how to properly setup a container/vm, they will just not do the latter 9/10.

Honestly, a harness should always install heavily gaurded, remember when Grok code/build was instantly indexing your home directory and sending it back to HQ on the first request it made..

▲ghosty141 13 hours ago | parent [-]

Like I wrote above I generally agree that the sandboxing should by enabled "by default" and should not be an extra opt-in that you have to know about first.

That being said I still believe this should be separated and composable at an application level and power users should be able to switch out the sandbox. This way you don't have to trust the harness since it doesn't know anything about the sandbox and can't modify it etc.

▲whoanoway 13 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

[dead]

▲trollbridge 13 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

You can make restricted GitHub accounts and API tokens.