| ▲ | saagarjha 5 hours ago |
| I just don’t think I agree with these designs at all. Everyone seems to be super laser focused on “not allowing their AI to have keys” when basically giving their AI direct access to what the keys enable, optionally adding a layer of ceremony in front where you tap “approve”. I’m looking at the alert that is shown there and I don’t see anything that makes me feel like it allows for an informed choice at the time of it popping up. So then, what’s the benefit? |
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| ▲ | rao-v 6 minutes ago | parent | next [-] |
| It's more about ensuring that the keys have some modicum of responsible control. If you give naked keys to Claude in a chat session and use something like atuin threads in 6 months to sync agent sessions across machines you might have put your keys in a a few dozen files without realizing it. In an ideal world, the key you give Claude isn't useful for more than X amount of time, and ideally not against the true endpoint at all. |
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| ▲ | jarym 6 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I keep seeing these various tools and asking myself the same question over and over. Security professionals have been muzzled around AI usage and people that don’t really seem to know much about it are now writing the most ill conceived things about how to secure it. |
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| ▲ | fractorial 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| As much as I wanted to say you’re wrong, you’re right. After reading TFA, the security boundary is not sound. Wanting agents to act like you is wrong. You need to own that trust boundary. Build whatever tooling satisfies the contract that agents should have a “not”+<you> (or <you>+”-agent”) identity, and you actuate across that boundary explicitly. For example, I have a second agent GitHub account that points at my human one. That allows me to write a trusted proxy that ACLs its identity tightly. It cannot write to public repos ever. In the worst possible case, it externalizes to a private repo’s issue tracker. (Still has never happened in ~4 months) Once you have this, you can let agents run free. But, it isn’t trivial to set up. Moreover, people don’t want to “do the work.” All this assumes you abide by “never run untrusted agents on trusted hardware.” |
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| ▲ | thayne 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I would certainly prefer having separate credentials with permissions limited to what I want to allow the agent to do. However I have run into two problems with that. The first, and bigger, issue is that some services either don't have have suffiently fine control over permissions, so in order to grant permission to do useful things, I also have to allow it to do dangerous things, or I don't have a way to create a more limited access token at all. I wish that it was more common to allow creating short-lived, limited accces personal access tokens for services. The smaller issue is that sometimes I do want the agent to do something more risky with my approval, and provide me with sufficient context to make an informed decision. That can sort of be worked around though by telling it to just give me the command to run, then I can audit and run it myself. | | | |
| ▲ | ozim an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | There is value in being meat proxy if that proxy enforces quality and security. Downside is a lot of people would act as pass through meat proxy doing busy work that agents could handle. So there is quite a lot of nuance here to be handled. |
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| ▲ | binsquare 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Basically these designs are meant to protect the key from leaking i.e. if agent holds key, prompt injections can happen. If agent never holds the key, then the risk profile changes. But you're right that it's a different problem to what access the key has and that's a different problem usually solved by having narrower keys or etc. disclaimer: I work on smolvm which does this at the networking layer and argued with myself on this too. |
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| ▲ | saagarjha 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Sure, my view on this is more or less that often the setup that creates this kind of situation often allows the agent to effectively mint a new key anyway. For example, if you have my browser cookie or something I may not want my agent to leak this on the web, but if I use it to authenticate network requests to the service transparently the model can just go into the account page and change my password or something, then leak that. In general it is not safe to hand an agent access to a service which is designed for human interaction and assume that it was properly secured such that persistent, transferrable access is not something that can be generated. | | |
| ▲ | unddoch 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | As Cursor generously demonstrated for the whole world, long-lived credentials in LLM transcripts are an attack path. Your transcript passes in plain-text through a chain of token and compute resellers. And you have no good way of knowing who those companies are and what type of "observability" they deploy. |
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| ▲ | protocolture an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | >if agent holds key, prompt injections can happen. I just rotate keys? And preload them with $$$. Following the same pragmatic advice that served me well trading crypto. Only gamble with what you are willing to lose. |
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| ▲ | recursivedoubts 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I'm trying to address this w/ clank.talk: a self-discoverable scripting language for agents that replaces bash with a controlled sandbox environment and strives to be easy for humans to read: https://clank.talk I'm designing this for the student AI infrastructure here at Montana State, to avoid rolling out the current wild-west of local agents to our student body. |
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| ▲ | saagarjha 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | AppleScript lives again? ;) I think it's an interesting concept, but it's really hard to do right. There are a lot of things that require very careful accounting for even in such a design–I see that you are already blocking access to .git for example, since the agent can drop code there that makes safe-looking commands like git status unsafe. This is definitely something I've been looking at, as well as taint tracking, it's just really hard. Would be interested to see where you take it! | |
| ▲ | xp84 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is pretty cool! I can’t help but be really reminded of AppleScript. Was that an inspiration? I’ve always hated AS, but the primary reason was difficulty learning to write it. Readability, I realize, was actually a huge strength. |
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| ▲ | krupan 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This is actually a big difference between giving someone you don't trust your keys and unlocking the door for them when they ask. |
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| ▲ | Zambyte 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | The problem with this analogy is that agents ask you to unlock your door all the time. People you don't trust don't normally ask that. | | |
| ▲ | willis936 an hour ago | parent [-] | | The benefit of the analogy is that I can trust someone to come and go but not trust them enough to not want to give them my house key for fear that they will copy it and give it to someone else. |
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| ▲ | antoniomika 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Truthfully, I tend to agree with you. I built lend mainly for the fact that I like ssh tools a lot (feel free to check my other projects) and have always wanted a way to run local commands without having to setup reverse ssh when I don't need to run sshd on my laptop. For example, I store k8s credentials in 1pass and the cluster is only accessible via the network on my remote machine. I can grab the credentials from my laptop for the work I want to do on the remote, and never have to install 1pass on the remote machine. Primary use case for lend wasn't agents when I started the project. It just was natural to add support for it after the fact. |
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| ▲ | saagarjha 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | What I do on my machine is I basically do not allow for local exec at all, except in some very specific scenarios where I carefully design the environment and make sure that it seems reasonable before handing it to the agent. For example, I have a specific profiling task that requires performance counters. Normally my agents can spin up VMs to run commands without my permission but in this case the counters are not exposed in the VM, which basically means that this must be run outside of the VM. In this case I have configured my setup to be that the agent is allowed to write to a binary at a specific location, and I approve of it running one command (in this case, without my supervision even) that is basically xctrace sandbox-exec [very restrictive handwritten profile] [this binary]. In this way, it can run code on my machine and get the metrics it wants, but it can't go "oh let me write a program to go and poke around the host machine" which it is prone to doing if you don't restrict it this way. I guess what I have done is the exact opposite in that I have designed an environment for agents and then I am using it as a hammer to solve all my problems, I have had almost exactly the same problem as you and the the way I typically solve it is that I have persistent SSH connections already supported in my harness, and I can arbitrarily expose whatever I want into the "agent environment" (which doesn't necessarily need to even have an agent living there), and this environment is able to connect to the place that doesn't have the credentials, and then I can set up a way for reverse access to work with this tunnel. |
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| ▲ | agentdev001 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > "when basically giving their AI direct access to what the keys enable" Well, ideally, you would be giving the model direct access to a subset of what a given key enables- if fine grained access control for generated keys isnt available. |
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| ▲ | cj00 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Not having the credentials make it into the chat transcript for one. |
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| ▲ | sroussey 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Which is often written to disk and found by any other software on the computer | | |
| ▲ | saagarjha 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | For what it's worth I have plenty of sensitive stuff in my transcripts and bash history and consider them to be game over if someone finds them, it's just very hard to design a model where this kind of thing can be protected against without making your development experience miserable |
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| ▲ | protocolture an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| >I just don’t think I agree with these designs at all. Everyone seems to be super laser focused on “not allowing their AI to have keys” when basically giving their AI direct access to what the keys enable, optionally adding a layer of ceremony in front where you tap “approve”. Yeah just follow least privilege. Give them only what they need/you trust them with. |
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| ▲ | petesergeant 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wrote a service for just that, which I should probably open-source. It basically wrapped permissioned APIs, and you would set fine-grained controls (eg you can email people at this domain without approval, but you need per-email approval for anything else). |
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| ▲ | Orygn 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| [flagged] |
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| ▲ | nghiemphucminh7 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| [flagged] |