| ▲ | rbartelme a day ago | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
The key requirement here is the client has to trust the proxy's CA. It's a client-side MITM, and the article itself notes pinned apps reject it. QUIC's crypto is fine. HTTP/3 just stopped being a blind spot for corporate TLS-inspection boxes. It's more interesting to split tunnel designs by where the trust lives: - ngrok / Cloudflare Tunnel: the edge terminates TLS by design, and your public hostname is ordinary WebPKI. Anyone who controls a visitor's trust store (inspection appliance, malware root cert) can do exactly this, and the provider can see plaintext anyway. - iroh-style P2P QUIC: there's no CA in the loop. You dial a public key (the EndpointId), and the TLS handshake authenticates raw keys, so it's pinned by construction. Relays forward ciphertext they can't terminate. A rogue root cert gets an attacker nothing; they'd need the peer's secret key. So "can someone MITM my HTTP/3?" really comes down to "who can add to the set of keys my client trusts?" For WebPKI that's a long list. For key-addressed transports it's nobody: the trusted key is the address you dialed, unless an endpoint's secret key (or the machine itself) is already compromised. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | 9cb14c1ec0 a day ago | parent | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
> HTTP/3 just stopped being a blind spot for corporate TLS-inspection boxes. Or alternatively said TSL-inspection boxes just block QUIC and everything auto-fails back over to HTTP/2, just like we've all been doing for years. | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | LeBit a day ago | parent | prev [-] | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
If my employer puts their CA in the corporate laptop they provide me and I try to access my private web site which uses a letsencrypt cert, the browser will tell me the cert does not match if my employer did mitm attack, no? | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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