But a digital copy of you isn't you.

I find I'm actually happier accepting a little nihilism in my life, knowing that at some point, I will die, and within a couple generations of my death, I will be completely forgotten.

This isn't depressing, it's freeing. It means there are no long term expectations of me, so I should I just spend as much time as I can doing the things I enjoy.

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somenameforme 17 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I'd agree with the premise, but I had a different conclusion. For me realizing I'm going to die, emphasizes something else. We're on this Earth for an ridiculously brief moment in time. And as you age time only goes by faster and faster. And so to me it emphasized the need to make sure there's another generation of humans to come after us. It led to a bit of an obsession with fertility.

That's probably about as realistically close as we'll ever come to being able to transfer your consciousness. But it's even better than just transferring your consciousness because it comes with the added of benefit that the 'new you(s)' have every chance of being even better than you, especially if you pick a good quality partner and raise them well. I don't care if my distant progeny have any idea I ever existed, but I want to give them a chance to exist, and I'll always be some small part of them anyhow.

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unrented7977 a day ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Distinction without a difference. My consciousness, my sense of self continues uninterrupted. There's no meaningful difference to me. You might care, but your opinion has zero weight on my own opinion of who and what I am.

One fudamentally cannot know the mind of another. Your opinion is based on incomplete observation and assumptions. Your insistence that a digital copy isn't me holds as much weight as the assertion that you aren't real because you exist only as text on my screen.

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Sohcahtoa82 a day ago | parent | next [-]

> My consciousness, my sense of self continues uninterrupted.

That's the part I directly dispute.

I don't dispute that a computer could become conscious, but I'm not convinced you could transfer your consciousness to a machine. If a brain scan copied your brain, that would not be the same consciousness that you have now. It would be like having a twin, and twins don't share a consciousness.

	▲	somenameforme 18 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Exactly this. Personally I would dispute a computer becoming conscious, but it's inconsequential to the argument. Even if it does become conscious, that consciousnesses is not you. You haven't transferred anything. You still die, and then have a chatbot in your likeness. For a technical issue I'd also add that this entire thing is becoming increasingly absurd given advances in understanding of human biology. Discoveries like the gut-brain axis emphasize that the concept of brains in a shell is mostly naive. Your body and your brain are completely interdependent to create 'you'. But again I think the objections around consciousness or technical possibility are completely inconsequential (if not also strong arguments in their own right). Even if we accept every single point and desired outcome, you still die.

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nancyminusone a day ago | parent | prev [-]

I suppose parent comment is addressing the version of you that doesn't wake up inside a computer. If a biological vetsion of you exists, then that version won't be the same instance as the one in the machine. There will be two copies.

Machine-you would no doubt be thrilled. How does bio-you cope with not being made immortal? If your answer is "It doesn't matter, throw the original in the trash" is that murder or suicide?

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pfdietz 8 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> But a digital copy of you isn't you.

I'll go further: a future biological you isn't necessarily you.

There's a continuity of being as we grow and age, but that's not enough to assert identity.

Identity is a useful (to our genes) mental fiction.