| ▲ | Trigger.dev customer environment variables exposed(trigger.dev) |
| 79 points by anurag 8 hours ago | 30 comments |
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| ▲ | corvad 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| I am sorry, this is "Resolved"? How can they even consider marking this resolved in any situation. Yeah we exposed your env vars but we told you about it over email so it's all good... We dont know how or to what extend though. |
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| ▲ | theturtletalks 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The biggest case for building bespoke software is that you drop your attack surface area and it’s not as lucrative to hack one person. Don’t even expose it to the internet if you don’t need to and just run Tailscale. |
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| ▲ | cbluth 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I think you've just explained why people rent infrastructure. | |
| ▲ | shepherdjerred an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | This is probably correct if you aren’t a target at all, e.g. you aren’t running a business |
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| ▲ | iampims 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It’s bold to set status page incident to resolved. |
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| ▲ | weird-eye-issue 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | If they fixed the exploit then what do you want them to do? Do they need to wait an arbitrary amount of time before setting it to resolved? | | |
| ▲ | eddythompson80 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | I don't disagree with you, but I think generally when the mistake involves compromised user data, the answer is a bit more emotionally driven. People get rightfully mad when things like that happens, and services usually keep the incident in a "Mitigated" status while they "work with their customers to ensure blah blah blah" or whatever. Everywhere I've personally worked the Mitigated->Resolved involves publishing a postmortem, repair items, and general assurances or safe guards based on learnings from the incident that the issue won't happen again. However, the industry as a whole doesn't have a standard for what the line between Mitigation and Resolution is. | | |
| ▲ | weird-eye-issue 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | So the active incident is now fixed and they've already reached out to impacted customers but they can't mark it as resolved yet because they are still yet to publish a more detailed blog post? | | |
| ▲ | jtchang 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It's not that they can't mark it as resolved.
It's just that it is bad business to do so. How they handle the communication on the incident is crucially as important as remediating the original cause. Just the fact that they are doing this means I will probably never use this service or recommend this service to anyone else. | | |
| ▲ | weird-eye-issue 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Okay so let's just say you are one of those affected users The founder of the company has already emailed you with details and their support team is around for you to ask any follow-up questions. Also the bug/exploit has been fully fixed At this point are you saying you would actually be upset and leave because the incident on their status page has been marked as resolved? | | |
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| ▲ | whilenot-dev 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | What makes you think it's fixed? They just state that they "blocked the exploit", and that could mean anything: - did they just take the affected API offline? - or did they just disable the account of the attacker? - or is the exploit actually being fixed? Environment variables are sensible data, and marking a security incident as resolved with that little detail is quite a take. Even changelog entries for harmless bug fixes are more detailed. | | |
| ▲ | weird-eye-issue 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I assume it's fixed based on it being marked resolved and from what was communicated. Yeah I agree it's a major issue but if it's fixed what they have done so far seems totally fine |
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| ▲ | rugma 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | they could have explained a bit better with proper postmortem and steps taken to improve, before marking it as resolved | |
| ▲ | Traubenfuchs an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | They are no longer exposing anything, so they no longer have an incident. Their customers now have an incident that will be resolved once their secrets are rotated. Maybe they also need to do previous intrusion forensics… In any case, not triggers problem anymore. | |
| ▲ | cheeze 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | I like the fancy gradient INCIDENT REPORT image as well. At least it looks fancy and AI-ey |
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| ▲ | BADCAFE 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This also happened to a trigger.dev competitor a few months ago, inngest. I was able to patch before it was exploited but that definitely made me question the service. |
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| ▲ | reassess_blind 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Have any of these companies disclosed the actual vulnerabilities used to gain access to their systems? |
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| ▲ | dboreham 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | No. Which may mean they don't know. | | |
| ▲ | tough 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | the recent CVE making any non-patched TCP exposed linux server RCE-root-able seems like a good stretch to me. But could also be any of the recent supply chain attacks hitting a dev too i guess |
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| ▲ | asdfsa32 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So at this rate, how long before people start hiding use of AI in development of in their SaaS and services? or people really don't care, do they? |
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| ▲ | Kiro 24 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Hand-made code is riddled with dirty hacks and exploits that LLMs have no problem finding. I would not trust any software that is not using frontier models to fix the messy human code. | | |
| ▲ | asdfsa32 12 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Oh that is right, the frontier models yield amazing architecture and secure code in the form of aislop. There is a difference between using AI to find bugs in written software than using AI to write bug free software, completely different set of skills and outcomes. Most of the high profile stuff you see is AI being driven by people who would have solved the same problem just in slower time going through the code. AI is as good as the operator. |
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| ▲ | fathermarz 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Holy smokes, is security just not a priority at all anymore? Like in what world do we live in, that this is acceptable. And at the volume this has been happening, bad guys are having a FIELD DAY. |
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| ▲ | cpursley 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| The very fact that Nextjs vibe projects need an external (and paid!) background jobs / async service show how much of an anti pattern that this framework and similar are. Just use a sensible stack from day one that can handle concurrency out of the box like Elixir or something with established open source background jobs library. Then you can worry less about this kind of paid 3rd party nonsense. Ditto on auth. I just can't fathom outsourcing these types or core functionalities, the operational, security and cost risks make very little sense when there's libraries that do this out of the box. |
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| ▲ | multiplegeorges 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, outsourcing these kinds of core functionality (your queue, your users table!) is insane to me. |
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| ▲ | rvz 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Given the recent Claude Code remote access tool, it would be wise to not install any new software, or use any package manager for a few weeks as they could have already been silently backdoored during the aftermath of that incident. |
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| ▲ | tough 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | I was paranoid enough to just remove all my Chrome/VSCode etc extensions. Im now thinking about just running tart VM's on my mac to do my regular stuff from. |
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