Former tailscalar here and now someone managing tailscale at an org.

Having done my own review of the vulns and the fixes as they are landing in github, its pretty clear to me that this only affects situations where you use ACLs to permit ssh into a node (via tailscale ssh, not via opensshd), but dont give a path to sudoers/root.

If a user had no SSH access and/or connectivity to a vulnerable node, none of these vulns give them access.

However, if you have a vulnerable tailscaled and you give ssh access as some non-root account/privs, then yes, these vulns are relevant as theres now known privilege escalations that give access beyond some specific user account.

Not trying to play down the vuln (its important), but its not a free-for-all RCE that some ppl are acting like it is.

I am fairly glad I have stuck with stock OpenSSH that ships with Linux. This incident proves I am glad with that choice.

Over the decades, I have maintained remote access through port forwarding on my router - at one point in 2008 I put SSH on port 80 so I could access it from the restricted wifi network at the hospital my grandmother was at. I have also used openvpn. I have also used cloudflare tunnels. But in the end, I always connect to hardened openssh with key only authentication.

Recently NetBird also had a huge privesc through their SSH component too... I'm using both at $DAYJOB and my personal infra, damn you guys ought to be more careful with such a sensible and important component...

I like Tailascale as a product but I decided to move my homelab to plain WireGuard.

I wasn't using any of the additional features, I can get away with exposing a port on my router and I am changing devices rarely.

News like this make me happy I removed a lot of complexity and attack surface

I self-host a tailnet with Headscale and could not be happier: https://headscale.net/stable/

  > Most of the Tailscale SSH issues we've identified concern privilege escalation. In some circumstances, someone already authorized to connect over Tailscale SSH may be able to perform actions beyond the permissions of their configured local user, including potentially gaining elevated privileges.

There are too many features, and lines of code (probably more than OpenVPN). I'm pretty sure there are all kinds of zero days, with this attack surface and feature set.

I use it extensively, and I would rather pay them a fee if they could review thr code.

Another possibility is as lock down mode, disabling fancy and risky features.

Not a tailscale user so I am a bit lost here: where does SSH fit into a Wireguard based VPN service?

Everyone is twitchy over security right now, but at first glance this seems not that bad. If the attacker has to be manually added to your tailnet that makes this not very exploitable. You should be more worried about all the iot slop on your local network.

Good idea to set up automatic updates for the tailscale client though.

With the success of Tailscale I would like to be sure that their repositories and scenarios are continuously reviewed. I understand that there is always a next hop in cybersecurity though.

I think it's so invasive that they ship this per default. But thats the business model i guess.