| ▲ | fennecbutt an hour ago | |||||||
That's a great way to do it. In terms of agent architecture I'm initially trying to minimise specialisation to make deployment easier on us. Infrastructure is becoming our largest blocker because it's otherwise so quick to get an agent up and running. With your trifecta, let's say the three musketeers, how do you prevent sensitive data holding A from passing said data to B or C if they all need to collaborate to get a task done? | ||||||||
| ▲ | smashed 41 minutes ago | parent [-] | |||||||
The data is passed as a message and the message is tagged as untrusted, so the engine knows it. Agent A has internet access and the dangerous message, but no access to the secret company data, so nothing can get exfiltrated. Agent B gets a tainted message from Agent A. Agent B can process the message using the secret company data. Agent B has no internet access and can only receive/send messages. You can imagine an agent C that moves the work along or replies to an external user with the outcome. Any workflow that has both an input and an output will complete the Lethal Trifecta as a whole, but no single agent does by itself. It raises the bar quite a lot, you need to confuse multiple agents in the loop to exfiltrate data. Fun research, but it's a bit hard to see all my coworkers right now installing Claude desktop and moving on with no afterthought whatsoever... Regarding infrastructure: my toy sandbox is just a docker-compose inspired YAML project file. So it's only containers. See my profile. The principle can be implemented anywhere you can run agents and cut network/data access though. | ||||||||
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