Well yeah, or have the website define which CA they use, and don't let any of the others certify it. Apparently there is already DANE for this but webbrowsers don't check it.

Besides, there could be more CAs supporting .in of course. And it becomes a matter of responsibility to the local government.

And national TLDs aren't meant to be trendy anyway. Many have restrictions on them to local businesses anyway, it would make sense to have the local domain authority have control over choosing CAs as well.

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akerl_ a day ago | parent [-]

> have the website define which CA they use, and don't let any of the others certify it.

Isn’t this exactly what CAA records are for?

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jeroenhd 11 hours ago | parent [-]

CAA is only verified by CAs. A malicious CA can ignore CAA records.

	▲	akerl_ 6 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Sure, but I’m only worried about CAs that exist in root trust stores, and a CA that ignores CAA records has two options: 1. Publish a CT record and tattle on themselves when they issue 2. Don’t publish a CT record and tattle on themselves when they try to use the cert Either one ends with them getting the boot from the root trust stores. There’s very few folks out there whose adversaries are willing to burn an entire root-trusted CA to attack.