As I understand it, the reason for so much work is that eMudhra was not a root CA. It wasn't added to any official root CA list, instead it was signed by a different root CA with the assumption that eMudhra will complete the work required to become a root CA and this hack will become unnecessary. This is a common, temporary process. So while all the mechanisms for root CA revocation were in place, no one was quite prepared for intermediate certificate revocation.

Take out the word root from my original reply. If you aren't prepared to immediately stop trusting a CA--root, intermediate, internal, then your process is broken

"no one was quite prepared for intermediate certificate revocation" is actually worse because as an intermediate CA, they obviously didn't meet the requirements to be a full root CA, so why wouldn't they be more likely to need revocation than a root? Honestly more negligent than being unable to revoke a root.

This is just wrong though, they were a root CA. There was cross-signing which is typical, but their `emSign ECC Root CA - G3` root certificate was in most CA bundles.

The root CA should have been revoked then.