| ▲ | Compromised LiteLLM 1.107.0 on PyPI Installs a Credential Stealer and Backdoor(safedep.io) |
| 104 points by abhisek 3 hours ago | 48 comments |
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| ▲ | hmokiguess 17 minutes ago | parent | next [-] |
| https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/47826#issuecomment... > OSS Users
> For the time being, please pin your version to 1.106.2 or any explicit version published prior to now. > Enterprise Customers
> There currently exists a private LiteLLM registry for enterprise customers, in which we are distributing an embargoed release that remediates a vulnerability whose disclosure date is scheduled for October 27. Our private registry is not affected. If you are an enterprise customer pulling from our private registry you are not affected. |
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| ▲ | baddash 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| litellm in the news again |
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| ▲ | TZubiri 36 minutes ago | parent [-] | | What's interesting here is that this will only affect those who did not migrate off LiteLLM after it was attacked the first time. I'm not saying everyong should migrate after there's a vuln, but I'm definitely saying that. Unless it's something huge and foundational like a programming language (PHP gets a second chance), just migrate within the next couple of weeks. I didn't even have it installed the first time, so the ideal programmers, (read, your competition), actually suffered 0 vulns from this dep, if you suffered 1, that's already pretty bad, being burnt twice should be a wake up call. If you get hit 3 times by the same dependency, it's a lost case. | | |
| ▲ | wongarsu 27 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | As someone who does not use litellm but instead a barely maintained underpowered alternative: what did everyone migrate to? If it matters, I am mostly interested in the aspect of having a proxy that unifies multiple ollama and openai-compatible endpoints with model-based routing and failover. Optionally with api-keys, reporting, budgets, etc. I do not particularly care about the MCP gateway, Agent-To-Agent thingy, and whatever else LiteLLM bolted on over time | | |
| ▲ | connorbrinton a minute ago | parent | next [-] | | Pydantic AI has a great set of abstractions over LLM providers. The documentation tends to focus on its agent loop more, but I find the LLM abstractions quite nice even on their own | |
| ▲ | tkz1312 25 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Claude will write you something custom that fits your exact requirements with zero supply chain risk in an afternoon. | | |
| ▲ | spike021 10 minutes ago | parent [-] | | how is there zero supply risk? claude will still package dependencies into a homemade solution at some level... | | |
| ▲ | tkz1312 7 minutes ago | parent [-] | | sure zero was a bit strong, but I personally feel pretty good about depending on only the go stdlib, compared to pulling in litellm. |
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| ▲ | john_strinlai 27 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | >PHP gets a second chance second? i haven't kept count, but we have to be somewhere in the hundreds of chances now |
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| ▲ | 1-6 9 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This is the 2nd time. I'm glad I moved away from this platform. |
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| ▲ | stbenjam an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| IMHO defaults for uv, npm, etc should all have a cooldown for 24 - 48 hours by default, you should have to go out of your way to install something newer. |
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| ▲ | robinhoodexe an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | We have 7d cooldown on packages on an internal pypi proxy but that blocks security updates also, which we now have to manually exclude from the cooldown. I’m unsure how to automate this properly, maybe an LLM is the best starting point. | | |
| ▲ | trollbridge 17 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Problem is, we leave ourselves open for LLM injection attacks. | |
| ▲ | mbrumlow 33 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | Are security updates immune ? | | |
| ▲ | tikkabhuna 19 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | They definitely wouldn't be if attackers knew that it would then bypass cooldowns! Ultimately, you need someone to verify releases and that probably means paying for it. I know Sonatype paid solutions utilise their own internal research to allow/block new releases. | |
| ▲ | dlkasajiewo 21 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | No, but there's a bigger tradeoff for not upgrading. In one case it's that you're potentially exposed to a known vulnerability, vs the other case where you might just be missing out on some new or slightly reworked feature. | |
| ▲ | fmbb 30 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It’s in the name. They are secure! | |
| ▲ | mattstir 21 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | But then an attacker marks their malicious release as a critical security update. It's really messy unfortunately. |
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| ▲ | giancarlostoro an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I wonder if in some cases it's not so much that people are updating too quickly, but rather, their deployment pipelines do not have pinned / frozen versions attached to their builds. | |
| ▲ | rcleveng an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | I didn't realize they've all such added that, this was a change we made to our own projects last year when these first started - glad to see it's common. Risk is ensuring enough security researchers are finding these and quarantining these before that default cooldown lapses. | | |
| ▲ | stbenjam an hour ago | parent [-] | | Yea, I think all the tools have this now but its not a default. Install scripts should also be turned off by default and require some hassle to turn them on for the first time in a package. |
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| ▲ | tech_solver an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| its litellm again. I wonder about maintainer trustworthiness |
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| ▲ | rcleveng 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Seriously again for litellm? I really with that things like Google ADK didn't add this to my deps. |
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| ▲ | cyanydeez 38 minutes ago | parent [-] | | all popular, free, ungated software will be poisoned; like kesler syndrome but for the world of open source software. |
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| ▲ | syntaxing 38 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I figured LLMs nowadays would be good enough to catch issues like this. Is it because it’s too costly to do it? |
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| ▲ | abhisek 34 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Yes if you use LLM to analyse everything. Not really if you analyse diffs, with heuristics to select candidates for LLM/agent based analysis. But at the cost of missing out novel attacks. |
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| ▲ | infecto an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Any package hosts that scan and include cooldowns by default that operate on a consumption model? The ones I have seen all charge a lot. |
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| ▲ | abhisek 33 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | Not sure about a service, but PMG enforces dependency cooldown and sandbox on package install. https://github.com/safedep/pmg | |
| ▲ | TZubiri 32 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Socket.dev Tell em Tom Zubiri sent ya (I don't get a commission, just good karma) | |
| ▲ | cyanydeez 40 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | man, people are going to be sorely disappointed in what's free on the internet in a couple of years. Agents and malware will eradicate all goodwill left. Good by internet. |
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| ▲ | SomaticPirate 5 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| [delayed] |
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| ▲ | callamdelaney an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Why on earth do these people make it impossible to select the title of their article? |
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| ▲ | nkjoep an hour ago | parent [-] | | it's just the poor styling of the selection highlight colour. | | |
| ▲ | hungryhobbit an hour ago | parent [-] | | To clarify a little further, you can select the title, you just can't tell that it's selected because the author made a "poor" (REALLY REALLY DUMB) decision to deliberately style away a basic browser feature (text highlighting). |
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| ▲ | santiago-pl an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| I wish all the best to LiteLLM team with handling it again. I can imagine how challenging are situations like this one. However, if anyone is looking for 20x faster and less "targeted" LiteLLM alternative - I'm work on one in Go. That's why GoModel it's called. https://github.com/ENTERPILOT/GoModel/ |
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| ▲ | ghrl an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Sounds like a reasonable choice of a language. I myself have written a small llm proxy in Go, doing nothing but injecting the real API key to outgoing requests while itself validating virtual keys it generates, and it works great. | | |
| ▲ | santiago-pl an hour ago | parent [-] | | Definitely it was a deliberated decision. Also enterprises adapt Go more and more. |
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| ▲ | TZubiri 32 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | If you don't use any LLM router, it's infinity times faster, and infitesimally as targetted. |
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| ▲ | 0xbadc0de5 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Again! Yikes. |
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| ▲ | jiwidi an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Twice? uiuiui |
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| ▲ | rvz 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| So in just 1 week: 1. Google Cloud Outage [0] 2. eMudhra CA private key Leak [1] 3. PingCap TiDB 10.6 TB data Leak [2] 4. PHP2Shell uncovers critical CVEs (with AI) [3] ...and now we have Round 2 of a LiteLLM compromise after the first one in [4]. [0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50163961 [1] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50166579 [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50173716 [3] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50180836 [4] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47501426 |
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| ▲ | gcr an hour ago | parent [-] | | don't forget today's NodeJS security update addressing its own RCE bugs! |
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| ▲ | petesergeant an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| > There currently exists a private LiteLLM registry for enterprise customers, in which we are distributing an embargoed release that remediates a vulnerability whose disclosure date is scheduled for October 27. https://github.com/BerriAI/litellm/issues/47826 oh boy. Announcing that there's a private enterprise repo you should be paying for if you don't want a credential stealer in your build is quite the optic, and then announcing there's an undisclosed second vulnerability that's being distributed, just not to the poors... |
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| ▲ | sullivanmatt an hour ago | parent [-] | | That's not what's being said, at all. They are simply telling their enterprise customers that there is a different build pathway for the enterprise builds and that pathway wasn't impacted by this issue. Also if you don't like organizations fixing vulns without releasing the open source first, you're going to be upset when you learn how every major vuln and associated patches are distributed long before the fixes hit the repos. A timely example of this is PHP, literally today. | | |
| ▲ | petesergeant 36 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > A timely example of this is PHP, literally today. Sorry, there was a paid-for PHP release that fixed it I could have gotten a week ago, and that they publicly announced existed, and it was just people who don't pay for PHP who had to wait...? | | |
| ▲ | sullivanmatt 16 minutes ago | parent [-] | | Yeah, that's how many companies with open ecosystems work. If you're using e.g. RedHat, you are getting packages with embargoed fixes baked into them before those fixes hit public repos. Node.js, OpenSSL, Git itself all do this. You can argue about whether the "publicly announced existed" part since they don't advertise for any single package, but that's the ecosystem you buy into. | | |
| ▲ | petesergeant 2 minutes ago | parent [-] | | > If you're using e.g. RedHat, you are getting packages with embargoed fixes baked into them before those fixes hit public git repos. The way you've written this is substantially misleading. RedHat receives notice of the vulnerabilities so they can prepare packages to be available the moment the embargo lifts, which I guess technically could hit the public packages a tiny bit earlier, but they are not releasing fixes of embargoed vulnerabilities to their commercial clients before the embargo lifts. This is substantially different from the policy I've quoted that I am objecting to. |
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| ▲ | bcvvvy 34 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] |
| Fuck this week. |