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▲ shiandow 6 hours ago

Making DNS secure is not trivial though. In a way that's just moving the problem.

▲josephg 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

A secure DNS is valuable whether or not we get rid of CAs, since CAs rely on DNS queries to verify domain ownership.

And if we have a secure DNS, then CAs are completely redundant. I'd much rather trust a handful of domain registrars than a handful of domain registrars, plus 100 random questionably competent organisations all over the world. Especially when any one of them can generate keys for every domain on the planet.

▲darkwater 4 hours ago | parent [-]

It seems a nice thing to have indeed, but domain registrars have already a history to cede control and bend to $GOVERNMENT. We have countries already trying to MiTM all their citizens by mandating CAs injection in every device under their jurisdiction, what would be the defense against this threat in a world where registrars hold the keys to TLS encryption for the web on the TLDs they own as root? I'm not that expert in this field so I really would like to learn if it's possible.

▲shiandow 2 hours ago | parent [-]

Not that it isn't an interesting question but what's preventing them now? You can get a certificate for any domain you control. It is just really obvious if you abuse that power. Which shouldn't really change with DNSSEC I think.

▲vesinisa 6 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Isn't this what DNSSEC solves?

▲muvlon 5 hours ago | parent | next [-]

DNSSEC deployment has been anything but trivial. This APNIC post from 2024 estimated that about 1% of DNS queries were being validated via DNSSEC: https://blog.apnic.net/2024/05/28/calling-time-on-dnssec/. That's more than 25 years after the IETF first standardized DNSSEC.

▲giantrobot 4 hours ago | parent [-]

2107: The year of IPv6, DNSSEC, and The Linux Desktop.

▲shiandow 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

It should, though it achieves that goal by a chain of certificates not unlike CAs just tied to DNS. Like I said, it essentially just moves the problem.

Which might still be better, if only because it limits the surface area.