| ▲ | maratc 5 hours ago | ||||||||||||||||
> No key files (like ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub and friends) littering the file system; and there’s no risk of mistakenly deleting them either. Or backing them up, or copying them to your new computer. You're just one spilled coffee cup away from losing the key. | |||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | jwr 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
That was my first thought, too — this might work as one of additional methods of logging in, but not as the only one. I have been using YubiKeys for many years now, following this guide: https://github.com/drduh/YubiKey-Guide This means I can have secure private keys for ssh and gpg (cue the crowd saying gpg is insecure without offering good modern alternatives), which I can also back up. And I can set up multiple YubiKeys, which I do. An additional advantage of this solution is that you can set your YubiKey to require a touch confirmation before performing an operation. This makes it much harder for runaway AI agents to wreak havoc on your servers: there is a physical limitation, which I really like. | |||||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | cedws an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
You aren't supposed to be moving SSH keys. They should stay on the machine they were generated on. The less accessible they are the better. I really wouldn't rely on an SSH key as the sole way of accessing a machine. | |||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | citrin_ru an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
You could generate an additional backup key pair, add to authorized_keys on remote hosts in additional to the stored in enclave key, test then backup and wipe from your macbook (to reduce compromise risk). | |||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | nmattia 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
I very much prefer to have one key per device! That allows for fine grained access control. In general I wouldn’t export private keys unless really necessary. | |||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | rustyhancock 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | ||||||||||||||||
Yes I don't see how that's helpful. It's quite opposite of what I'd want. If you use a trezor hardware wallet (and probably other hardware wallets) you can deterministically regenerate -sk keys. I use trezors various agents for AGE, FIDO2/passkey, ssh[0]. But you still need the backup some bits of material like stubs for some FIDO keys (not secret material) that need importing into fresh trezor devices. It's approaching the never lose a key again levels. Of course, I won't pretend there isn't an obvious issue. What if you lose the seed words or someone gains access. What if the software becomes incompatible, or trezor devices become expensive/change etc. | |||||||||||||||||
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| ▲ | jiehong 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | ||||||||||||||||
Yes, this only works if you can register more than 1 ssh keys on the services you want. | |||||||||||||||||
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