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| ▲ | xtajv 7 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I think it bears mentioning that like sand castles, software engineering has approximately zero building codes. Try kicking over a building sometime. (Or don't - you'll stub your toe). | | |
| ▲ | RugnirViking 20 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | buildings may be quite hard to destroy, but the relevant question is whether it is proportionally harder to build one. required codes and standards may raise one (difficulty of removal) or both (difficulty of removal + difficulty of construction) in varying proportion. | |
| ▲ | nkrisc 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In the physical sense, entropy favors the attacker because destroying something is just helping it along the path it wants to take. Everything wants to turn into dust, all the time. It takes energy to prevent it from happening. The attacker can use significantly less energy to get it moving. Consider the energy requirements to construct a skyscraper compared to the energy requirements to demolish one. | |
| ▲ | consumer451 7 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Well, I don't want to get on the capital E - engineering tangent regarding software. But yeah, agreed on that. In most cases, we have been vibe engineering software this whole time. Tangent aside, entropy favors the attacker even in the case of a building that has PE stamps on the plans and passes all codes at time of construction. Just leave it alone for a while with no maintenance, it will fall. Or, hire one man to correctly place charges. Far less work than what it took to build it. edit: I want to make clear that what amazes me is how hard we fight entropy. We have built fragile societies, fragile technologies, we ourselves are fragile. And yet, humans are generally pretty cool and choose not to destroy all of these things, though we do have a few assholes amongst us. | | |
| ▲ | Alive-in-2025 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | "Software architecture" and engineering quality overall has had questionable quality at best. I don't see how vibe coding big new systems will make it better. I predict vibe coding will make for an even more golden age of hacking and a large increase in ransomware and breaking into systems. Today's giant hodgepodge of glued together software products could actually be better than vibing up something new. I'd also expect the offensive side of hacking into systems will greatly benefit from LLMs finding an almost endless series of new vulnerabilities in even crappier llm software. I'm just so cynical. | |
| ▲ | jubilee33 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | That's kind of the definition of life tho, a system that fights, or "exports" entropy. Built in to our very code. Even the sand castle kickers are doing it for many years just just to be able get to the point to kick. |
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| ▲ | _vertigo 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | “It’s easy to destroy a building than to build one” is still true, building codes or not. | |
| ▲ | piltdownman an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | I mean for just the EU you have: Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) and Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) which enforce mandatory governance and processes like resilience testing and cybersecurity lifecycle requirements. GDPR & Data Protection frameworks which requires architecture to support CRUD operations on all PII, data minimization, customer-managed encryption architectures and so forth. ...and the anti-vibe code framework aka the EU AI Act, which requires human oversight and data quality controls. This is completely aside from any industry specific engineering codes like in Finance where you have to adhere to things like ISO 20022 or iXBRL/ESEF standards, user accessibility mandates, and PCI Compliance mandates for things like Security Architecture over and above the CRA. |
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| ▲ | jacquesm 9 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yes, I've worded this as 'the asymmetry between creation and destruction'. Any idiot can destroy a piece of glass, it takes a whole raft of experts to make a pane and then some more to properly mount it. | | |
| ▲ | maxbond 8 hours ago | parent [-] | | Per the IRA after an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Thatcher, "Today we were unlucky, but remember we have only to be lucky once, you will have to be lucky always." | | |
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| ▲ | lrvick 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | It is not a base truth. It is just that complete negligence is currently standard, legal, and expected in most industries. Kind of like before basic sanitation was legally mandated at hospitals preventable deaths dramatically higher. I have designed and audited systems for dozens of orgs that protect hundreds of billions in value and regular transaction volume. HSMs, remote attestation, quorum controlled servers with custom and fully audited operating systems, and in some cases a geodistributed network of underground bank vaults, NSA tempest spec zero emissions chambers, and security down to the laws of physics. Security can be assured with high confidence for the right price, but very few are willing to pay for it and fewer still experienced enough to offer it. 15-200k a week is common depending on reputation, but I know at least one that claims to bill 1m/w. Personally I do not believe hoarding effective security tactics for private audiences is ethical, and thus I insist any security work and research resulting from my work for employers, clients, and my own companies must all be freely licensed open source. No exceptions for any amount of money. Security will be normalized when it as open, cheap, and too easy to justify not doing. Shameless plug, this is why I co-founded Caution. | | |
| ▲ | close04 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | > It is not a base truth. When you operate in an environment where every "good boy" can be wiped by a single "oh shit", statistics are against you. That is a base truth. The failure can rest on negligence but negligence isn't a necessary component for failure. For attackers their failures are wiped by a single success, for defenders their successes are wiped by a single failure. In a different life I worked on designing and implementing similar systems to the ones you described, except with even more money going through them. They can can still be hacked, at incredible expense. And the hackers could even make a huge profit with the treasure trove they have access to. But getting away with it is orders of magnitude more difficult than the hack. The money involved to make the hack profitable is impossible to hide on the world stage. It takes a lot of political capital and military to be able to steal billions+++ and get away with it (nation state attackers, not just a group of hackers). So hackers go for lower risk jobs where the payout can even be similar just because of the lower cost to succeed. |
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| ▲ | keiferski 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Doesn’t entropy also lead to more weak targets, therefore the secure defensive target is less appealing? The whole “you don’t have to outswim the shark, just the guy next to you.” | |
| ▲ | forkerenok 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Yes, but I think that asymmetry manifests itself in the opposite direction too: It's much harder to have perfect opsec and never be caught for the wrongdoing. The other side only needs patience. | |
| ▲ | thrawn0r 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I think its generally true. attackers have to get it right only once, where as defenders have to get it right every single time. | |
| ▲ | chicken-stew 6 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | WP was designed around the idea that it should be easier to improve than deteriorate. | |
| ▲ | pinevale 7 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > In one of Sean Carroll's AMA's, he once said something along the lines of "entropy favors the attacker over the defender." Eh, kinda. The defenders have the advantage of playing on the home turf. They know their infrastructure, can have sensors and traps everywhere. The bad guys are stumbling in the dark. They have no idea what's real and what's a honeypot, what signals you're watching, etc. The problem is that almost no one takes this advantage seriously. If you're not paying attention to your infra, yeah, you're gonna get owned. | | |
| ▲ | vincnetas 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Yeah but you know there trade offs like free society, freedom of movement, privacy and stuff that you need to sacrifice to take advantage of home turf. And you need to do this everywhere. Attacker can pick his targets on his own schedule, you need to defend always. | | |
| ▲ | consumer451 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | It just goes to show how pro-peace and stability humans are in general. It's so easy to cause death and destruction, and we most often do not choose to do that. While maybe peak_local_max_asshole = true, we have certainly been progressing in that direction, haven't we? | | |
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| ▲ | cindyllm 7 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | [dead] |
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| ▲ | mikeyouse 9 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | The vast majority of the competent people got DOGE’d. CISA lost like 40% of their staff including much of their red team specialty. 18F was completely eliminated (“Deleted” as Musk put it). If some specialist in the FBI who could have helped prevent the hack happened to have been assigned to work on the Classified Docs case, they were also fired because the most corrupt, incompetent group of morons is running things in DC for the next few years. | | |
| ▲ | esalman 9 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | One of the most spectacular pieces of self-own for the current administration. Restructuring/deleting the directorate for biodefense during the previous administration (of the same color) would be up there. | | |
| ▲ | jacquesm 9 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | I can see quite a few not-so-good reasons why they wanted to weaken the cybersecurity capability of the federal government. | |
| ▲ | qlte 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | ...then the next predictable stage in the starve the beast cycle: "Why does CISA even need to exist? When was the last time you heard them do anything useful at all? Might as well shut them down and use a contractor in the private sector who knows how to get shit done and save taxpayer money on pensions." ($400 million no-bid contract goes to Oracle paying 5x as much per person, misses deadline for every key milestone, after one more $200 million extension claims government terms were impossible to meet and never delivers anything useful) | | | |
| ▲ | vkou 9 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | It's not a self-own if they aren't the ones why have to deal with the consequences. Do you think Donnie loses a microsecond of sleep over this? | | |
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| ▲ | DANmode 9 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > 18F was completely eliminated 18F -> https://ndstudio.gov As seen credited on recent publications like real realfood.gov. | | |
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| ▲ | cowsandmilk 9 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | +1, in this case, the hackers exploited a CVE in PeopleSoft that had a published patch. The contractors just didn't apply the patch. https://www.reuters.com/technology/accenture-contractor-remo... | |
| ▲ | derektank 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Government service pays far less than the private sector, particularly for software engineers. If you’re paying 2nd decile prices, you’re going to get 2nd decile performance. | |
| ▲ | jacquesm 9 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | If they're incompetent and lazy as you say then probably because they couldn't... |
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