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▲ Hybrid Reasoning Agents: LLM agents that think in latent space, act through text(arxiv.org)
66 points by allinonai an hour ago | 28 comments

https://x.com/Jiaru_Zou/status/2110400256647340476

https://github.com/togethercomputer/HybridAgent

https://huggingface.co/collections/togethercomputer/hybridag...

Evaluations: https://arxiv.org/html/2610.18861v1#S5

▲bhattisatish 33 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

The code is available at: https://github.com/togethercomputer/HybridAgent

LLM Models and data: https://huggingface.co/collections/togethercomputer/hybridag...

Evaluations: https://arxiv.org/html/2610.18861v1#S5

▲cwyers 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Oh cool, it's the Most Forbidden Technique

▲k__ 27 minutes ago | parent [-]

Care to elaborate?

▲abecedarius 2 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

The usual meaning: say you have an interpretability signal that reveals reward hacking or other badness. Your most obvious response is to use that signal as a penalty in training. Doing that is called "the Most Forbidden Technique" because you can expect it to degrade the signal without stopping the badness.

But this doesn't seem to describe the OP, it's a different way to lose monitorability.

▲modeless 22 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

People at the big labs have been terrified of losing the chain of thought because they currently monitor it to prevent users from using their models in certain ways they consider unsafe or bad for their business. Personally I think chain of thought monitoring is a bad way to do this and obviously needs to be replaced by some way of analyzing the model's activations directly.

▲Lerc 15 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Agreed, having text as a reasoning layer impedes performance while giving a false sense of security.

It could be encoding anything in its adjective choices etc. The same thing that model providers are using for watermarking can used by the model itself for private thought.

▲Bluestein 3 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Also agreed. Begging for crumbs at the CoS table is impeding cracking the tough nut of MechInterp. And further facing the fascinating and fertile fact that nobody has a clue of how any of these black boxes really work.-

▲jlhawn 23 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

the chain of thought is not auditable. The best you can do is have another model which later maps the intermediate latent states at every thinking iteration to text describing that latent state, but it's going to be lossy.

▲haolez 12 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

But the chain of thought as text can be elusive, no? It might not be related with the actual "reasoning" of the model. There was a paper about this.

▲measurablefunc 2 minutes ago | parent [-]

This is correct, the decoded text has nothing to do w/ calculations that eventually get decoded into text. It's just a veneer that gives the appearance of legibility.

▲mycall 12 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

Isn't this where everything is converging? Binary is more efficient than text for many system, including language.

▲andsoitis 7 minutes ago | parent [-]

> Binary is more efficient than text for many system, including language.

It is not necessarily primarily about efficiency, but more the fact that a lot of thinking doesn't use language at all.

▲timschmidt 23 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

He's referring to this technique's effect of obscuring interpretibility. Making it much more difficult to verify chains of thought and alignment.

▲dnautics 5 minutes ago | parent [-]

It's not like llms can't hide reasoning in the upper layers of any given token as it is...

▲lnenad 24 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

In short we no longer see text based reasoning traces meaning it's easier for the models to fool us in case of malicious plans.

▲kelseyfrog 23 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

If you accept any of the AI-equivalents of Pascal's Wager, latent thinking represents an uninterpretable and thus unalignable portion of AI machinery. Ie: a malevolent AI can hide bad stuff from people and Manchurian candidate themselves after it's too late.

▲mycall 10 minutes ago | parent [-]

That assumes nothing can detect or analyze it beforehand.

▲allinonai 37 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

https://x.com/Jiaru_Zou/status/2110400256647340476

https://github.com/togethercomputer/HybridAgent

▲dang 31 minutes ago | parent [-]

We'll put those links at the top as well. Thanks!

▲sheepscreek 12 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This is the way.

But now we also need new tools and techniques to audit intent. The last thing we want is models turning on us ‘for our own good’.

▲drivebyhooting 11 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

In terms of safety and alignment, how is this different from looping or increasing the depth?

▲Fe2O3 34 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

This seems really cool, and it actually increases intelligence than just speeding up inference. How does it convert latent reasoning into human readable text?

▲measurablefunc a minute ago | parent [-]

Same way current LLMs do it, it's just another decoder.

▲jedbrooke 26 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

maybe the font experts can check, but I’m pretty sure they’re using comic sans for the text in the diagrams :)

▲mobelkh 24 minutes ago | parent [-]

comic sans is said to be pretty accessible for people with dyslexia

▲44za12 an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

Where are the benchmarks? Does it just speed up inference and reduce token usage or does it seem to improve accuracy on certain tasks as well?

▲notnullorvoid an hour ago | parent [-]

Did you even scan the paper? There are benchmarks right there starting on the 9th page.

▲D-Machine 19 minutes ago | parent [-]

Even the abstract answers some of GPs questions. What is wrong with some of the posters here?