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| ▲ | tptacek an hour ago | parent | next [-] |
| This CBC chaining thing is my all-time absolute favorite cryptography conspiracy theory, because on the IETF list where it happened (it happened for IPSEC, not for TLS, for what it's worth) Phil Rogaway pled with long-time standards body people --- even took up a petition of cryptographers, including Rivest --- and was openly and viciously mocked for the attempt. The US government had no need to corrupt IPSEC standardization. The IETF did the work for them without prompting. |
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| ▲ | duskwuff 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| > TLS 1.0’s CBC chaining made IVs predictable and enabled the BEAST attack. That’s a documented protocol weakness, allegedly put in there by US state actors on purpose. This is errant nonsense. At the time SSL/TLS were designed, using CBC with block ciphers was generally considered best practice - it was not at all an unusual choice. |
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| ▲ | tptacek an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Using CBC is fine. TLS and (prior to that) IPSEC set the CBC IV of messages to the last ciphertext block of the previous message --- pretending as if they were encrypting one long stream, rather than discrete messages. That's never been OK, and cryptographers warned about it at the time. | |
| ▲ | robrain 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Arrant nonsense, surely? |
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