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▲ Joel_Mckay 17 hours ago

In general, a session/thread ephemeral key pair is exchanged with the participants, and only each users private origin signing validates each sender sections. Since the signatures are passively checked, it does not need redone after each append operation.

Thus, participants are pooled under 1 time constrained key exchange, participants sections origins are signed/time-stamped, and the ciphertext expires on a schedule.

Why? so at some future time side-channel key exfiltration can't be used to data mine the entire history of past tapped conversations/ciphertext. Even if a private signing key is stolen, it is difficult to rebuild the lost ephemeral key session.

Have a nice day. =3

▲sire-vc 16 hours ago | parent [-]

My eyes glazed over reading that. I feel like 30 years of internet has proven one thing: the simplest solution always wins. PGP is many things, but simple and obvious are not among them.

▲Joel_Mckay 15 hours ago | parent [-]

Mozilla Thunderbird e-mail client, and Android k9 mail makes pgp/gpg public key handling fairly trivial.

Depends what you do, and if your organization has a persistent clown infestation. Some big business folks still use email as a human to API interface.

Running out-of-band public keychains is not something most people will ever need. =3