Safeguards are a safety net for when your security boundaries fail. With security boundaries, hope is not a strategy.

In practice it seems we have a conundrum in that making AI agents useful today requires giving them broad access to sensitive information and operations. But from a purely idealistic standpoint, and certainly from a standpoint of a serious operation like those bot farms being ran by the labs themselves, the security boundaries need to be solid to the point where we have hard limits on what misaligned bots can do. It is very likely that internet access needs to be strongly restricted and monitored.

It is not uncommon for internet in workplace offices using workplace owned devices to have restrictions and monitoring, I think if you really need to give a giant scary botfarm internet access you should have a chokepoint where all of the requests can be monitored for nefarious-looking behaviors (even if it's another bot doing the monitoring...)

In other words, you may be convinced but some of us are not. Whoever is running the agents is responsible for what they do and if they can't contain them they should be legally responsible for damages.

If what you're saying is "all of us and all of our software needs to be improved to defend against this", well yeah. Of course. Maybe I'm naive but I've never seen anyone suggest otherwise. From a defense standpoint, this has been a giant wakeup call to many places where you know your security posture sucks. I've worked at maybe a single company where there weren't known weaknesses, some very severe.

I think part of the problem is that the Big Ai labs are into the --yolo flag instead of the "ask" permission, they really do not want to stay in the loop