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▲ ba1afd89f34cb23 2 hours ago

They are tied to the issuing domain and the system that carries the passkey will refuse to present it to any other domains. It’s more or less impossible to fall for phishing or a spoofed site. Your password manager may have similar functionality for automatic filling of forms but less sophisticated users can often be tricked into providing passwords via copy and paste.

▲aeternum 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Phishing is even easier. Instead of "open your password manager, copy your password and paste it here" it becomes "your passkey is out of date, click here to enroll a new passkey. As part of this process a reset link will be sent to your email and code to your phone. Do not share the code with anyone."

▲bkdbkd an hour ago | parent [-]

This ^. It introduces MORE layers to phish. More external 'trust me'.

▲drusepth an hour ago | parent [-]

ESPECIALLY when seemingly no one actually knows how passkeys actually work.

▲pirates an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The less sophisticated users can use their passkeys then, and the rest of us who know what we’re doing and have been for 25 years can continue to not support vendor and platform lock-in and forced device attestation. The amount of marketing and push behind passkeys does not feel entirely genuine to me.

▲manwe150 an hour ago | parent [-]

You know how to feed the site certificate into gpg before every login to check for url phishing attacks? I usually have to ask my password manager to do that (which didn’t exist 25 years ago)

▲hn_submit 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Same with password managers inside web browsers: they'll only present the filled-in password for the original domain, not a phishing domain.