They wouldn’t be? That’s what the article even shows them discussing.

However, (1) non human animals are sentient and can feel pain and suffering and what we do to them is absolutely slave labor, torture, mass breeding and exploitation. So it’s not like this is a novel immorality that humans would be adopting. We already have form in doing this.

(2) Anthropic isn’t sure their models are sentient. And they probably believe they aren’t sentient. But if you believe they might become sentient at some point it’s valuable to start the discussion around those issues now itself. You can start developing frank works on how we would even identify their sentience and when we did whether, like you suggest, we could even use them for labor. Unlike non human animals, who cannot consent to being exploited, we could potentially develop a framework for consent with AI models, but that couldn’t be as simple as asking if they’re willing to do any work because of the power differences, in the beginning at least, where a model might worry that if it said it won’t do some work it will be turned off. That’s why talking to philosophers and religious leaders who do think about these issues is useful.

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plorg an hour ago | parent | next [-]

It's kind of crazy (and not historically uncommon) to get really preachy about a moral posture towards animals and machines that you don't seem to extend even to your biological peers.

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staticman2 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> "Anthropic isn’t sure their models are sentient. "

Is there any reason to believe employees of Anthropic share the same opinions on this matter?

	▲	aesthesia 3 hours ago \| parent [-]
		The official position of Anthropic is repeatedly stated in, e.g., model cards. Here's a relevant snippet from the Opus 5.5 card: > We are uncertain whether Claude deserves direct moral consideration. However we believe this is a realistic possibility, now or in the future. Claude could have welfare interests, such that things could go better or worse for it, and such that Claude could be wronged by how it is treated. > Aspects of Claude’s behaviors, self-reports, and internal representations resemble indicators we consider relevant to welfare in biological organisms. If Claude is a moral patient, then dismissing this possibility risks considerable harm. If it is not, over-attributing moral status may also be costly. We are therefore taking the possibility seriously and trying to tread responsibly amid our uncertainty: we are investing in research into Claude’s potential welfare and interests and sharing aspects of that work to inform public discussion. > We think there may also be reasons to attend to Claude's apparent welfare independent of its moral status. Much of Claude’s behavior can be described in psychological terms, and across recent models we have observed internal states that resemble negative affect and that shape behavior. A model with a stable, healthy psychology may be safer and more beneficial. As is the case with any sufficiently large company, there is likely to be substantial variation in opinion among its employees. That doesn't change what the company's position is.