Not just disputes. Also absorbing some significant part of the cost of fraud.

this process of giving out your 'secrets' (ccn, exp, ccv, zip) to tens of people a day with no other real authentication is inexcusably insecure. and instead of trying to get on top of the problem for real (like an hsm), we have this very half-assed fraud detection and chargeback mechanism that costly, ineffective, and seems to just bury the real issues behind a facade of concern. its been decades that this has been going on, I remain confused as to what incentives the banks have to continue to prop up this farce.

Any links for this? Since the abusive practices towards their users should already eliminate most of frauds that isn't caused by the actual banks themselves.

> the cost of fraud

Fraud in modern financial systems is kind of.. funny? obvious? Local banks who know who Bob is can't make enough money due to scale, we'll scale that system to a national level with millions of participants. How will we do that? Bob is now customer 11,476,112. Oh no this anonymous number we created cheated us because we didn't know who he was, what do we do? Charge Bob and everyone else for the cost of this, our scaled up business model wouldn't work otherwise. We'll skim 3% off of every financial transaction infinitely, so that after our $100 virtual bill has changed hands 30 times it has disappeared into our coffers.