Wuffs author here.

Congratulations to the Halide folks on wpd, their new decoder. The performance numbers are impressive. If wpd (a Rust library) works for you, great, you should use it!

But since Wuffs was mentioned, I'll just drop a few selling points for why you'd still consider Wuffs.

1. Wuffs' implementation is transpiled to C code (and that in-C-form is checked into the repository, as well as into the leaner google/wuffs-mirror-release-c Github repo). If your existing project is C/C++, not a Rust one, then it's very easy to add Wuffs as a dependency. It's like adding any other third-party C library. It's just not hand-written .c code. It's hand-written .wuffs code that gets transpiled to a single-file C library, as easy to integrate as the STB libraries but memory-safe.

1.a. Similarly, if you're a Python project, or Java, or whatever, if you can wrap C code, you can wrap the Wuffs library (in its C form) and still get in-process, memory-safe image decoding without having to add a new toolchain to your build process.

2. Wuffs is a zero-capability language. It's a language for writing (safe) libraries, that only compute. It's not a language for writing applications. The Wuffs language cannot open files or write to the network. It can't even dynamically allocate memory. That means that Wuffs code can operate under `SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT` sandbox that prohibits basically everything except reading from stdin and writing to stdout.

2.a. For out-of-process, extremely memory-safe image decoding, the example/convert-to-nia/convert-to-nia.c program in the Wuffs repository reads an image (JPEG, PNG, WebP, etc) on stdin and writes NIA (a trivial image format, similar to Farbfeld) on stdout. Even if you don't want to audit the Wuffs language and toolchain itself, the security review for that convert-to-nia program is also absolutely trivial, because one of the first things that the main function does is to self-impose a `SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT` sandbox.

3. Wuffs uses intrinsics for SIMD, like C/C++, but memory safety is enforced on all loads and stores. And the toolchain also enforces that Wuffs general code can't call into Wuffs AVX2-using code unless your cpuid is AVX2-capable. The memory safety story of all of that is a bit better than just "we do SIMD via assembly in unsafe blocks". Wuffs (the language) doesn't even have an "unsafe" keyword.

These are all valid points, and I think the wuffs project makes a lot of sense for certain use cases. But, I think when characterizing wpd, "we do SIMD via assembly in unsafe blocks" is a bit of a mischaracterization. wpd doesn't implement its decoder using Rust SIMD inside broad unsafe regions. Unsafe code is denied throughout the crate and allowed only in the dedicated assembly binding module; without assembly, the crate uses forbid(unsafe_code).

The handwritten SIMD kernels sit behind safe Rust wrappers that calculate or validate the exact slice bounds before producing raw pointers, and CPU-specific routines are only installed after runtime feature detection. wpd even has guard-page tests specifically checking that the assembly kernels don't read or write beyond those wrapper-established windows. Handwritten SIMD was valuable enough that we felt this was all worth it (see some of the dav1d talks for justifications, we share these views).

Wuffs does still have a stronger formal property in the fact that its compiler checks the loads & stores inside the SIMD implementation itself, but most of the interesting memory safety attack surface (parsing and decoding attacker-controlled structure) remains entirely in safe Rust in wpd anyway, so I think wpd is still safe and incontrovertibly a significant improvement over libwebp anyway.

P.S. you can disable wpd's assembly if you feel so inclined, and get similar performance to Wuffs with safety.