| ▲ | simoncion an hour ago | |
> ...talk to the to the staff. Not the evil CEO, but the nerdy guy on the ground who graduated from a top university... Why would I talk to the people who don't have the power to set company policy and fire anyone who fails to comply with it? I've worked at several big companies over the years and have observed the only even vaguely reliable power that folks at the bottom have to change company policy that management substantially benefits from is to quit en mass. > ...but it misses the point, and lulls us into the feeling of having quick solutions available. The point is that these companies claim they're working on oh so dangerous tools that are very likely to kill us all, but the evidence that these companies don't behave even a little bit like this is true keeps pouring in. The CEO [0] can set company policy. In the US, the CEO [0] can fire people who fail to comply with policy. Most folks would -correctly- think that a CEO of a company who is working on a tool that has a high chance of destroying humanity is very interested in not destroying humanity (accidentally or otherwise)... if for no other reason than the fact that once all of the humans are dead, his company can't make any more money! > Junior researchers think they're just top stuff. In sane companies, when a junior staff deletes the prod database, an investigation is launched to understand if the deletion was unintentional and -if it was- what about the company's procedures need to be fixed to make sure that that doesn't happen again. In sane companies, when one performs a live test of a tool that has * been designed to attack computers * been instructed to attack computers * had its safeties removed one ensures that this computer-attacking tool cannot attack computers that aren't owned by the company. Both OpenAI and Anthropic have way too many senior staff on staff to be unaware of this... the fact that the computer-attacking tools could get out to the Internet is -at best- negligence. [1] [0] ...and many-to-most managers in one's management chain... [1] For a discussion of the decades-old techniques for preventing computers in datacenters from escaping logical airgapping see [2] and [3] | ||