How did the board plan pull this off if Mullenweg has 84% of the voting shares? For that matter, what is even the purpose of a board in a multi-class share structure with the founder holding above 50% voting shares.

Fig leaf and a way to offload some responsibility. I would never ever join a board like that, you're in the hot seat when it goes wrong and yet you have no agency.

> For that matter, what is even the purpose of a board in a multi-class share structure with the founder holding above 50% voting shares.

I guess it was mostly advisory, with the added purpose of making it seem like the various organisations were stewarded by members of the community that were not Matt Mullenweg.

Just looking at shares is over simplistic.

You can't know what other conditions Mullenweg signed in contracts such as shareholders agreements etc.

Typically if you take VC money, the VCs will require the ability to sack the founder and take control, perhaps if particular targets are not met.

I've seen it: an ambitious owner agreed to stretch goals, and the VCs took took over the company from the founder after they had predictably failed to meet the goals.

> what is even the purpose of a board in a

Delaware law requires a board.

Whether limited liability should actually be allowed at all in such a situation is a better question.

They expected this to fail, they gave themselves golden parachutes: https://techcrunch.com/2026/09/16/automattics-interim-ceo-an...