| ▲ | ragall 3 hours ago | |||||||
> Alternatively, Matt can resign if he doesn't like what his bosses did The board members weren't "his bosses", he's "the boss" and the board serves as his pleasure, within the limits of the Delaware statutes with regards to the protection of minority shareholders. | ||||||||
| ▲ | tptacek 3 hours ago | parent | next [-] | |||||||
That's sort of true and sort of not, right? He's not in fact "the boss" of the board, though with his voting ability (and that of his committed proxies) he can replace the board instantly. The board has every right to fire the CEO. That's not at issue. The board could reasonably do that even if the CEO has majority voting control --- iff the board is certain the CEO won't immediately reverse the decision and replace the board. If they fire the CEO performatively (or as a hail mary) knowing the CEO will reverse them, they're causing operational chaos with no upside, and that's not something the board can legitimately do. There's a subtext in some comments about this that the board can legitimately express a position that it's better that the company not exist than exist with Mullenweg at the helm. That's not a legitimate thing for the board to pursue. | ||||||||
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| ▲ | pdpi 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | |||||||
> The board members weren't "his bosses", he's "the boss" and the board serves as his pleasure Both are true. The board as a whole is his boss in his role as CEO. He is the board's boss in his role as majority shareholder. That makes the situation a little less clear. | ||||||||