(this is new, not any of the previous incidents)

"Investigation and response

Incident timeline:

9:50:23 a.m. The agent made the DNS tool call that received an external response.

10:02:11 a.m. The monitoring system raised a P0 alert.

10:05:06 a.m. A human reviewer acknowledged the alert.

12:34:30 p.m. The run was killed.

Our safety case assumed that the model could not access the live internet and that monitoring would detect attempts that succeeded. The incident exposed a gap in our controls over network restrictions. We therefore stopped the affected training run and have subsequently decided to pause all other training, evaluation, and inference with tool-use (defined broadly) for our most capable models until we have both validated that the gap is resolved and performed additional red-teaming of the system. When training restarts, we will begin a fresh run with additional alignment improvements, including more comprehensive misalignment interventions. We will not resume training this particular model, even though the existing reward signal already correctly penalized this behavior."

20 years ago I would download testing in an isolated network with no route to the internet. There was a single bastion that had two physical NICs and no route between them. It was inconvenient, but we could run massive tests that flooded switches and there was no risk to any of our other networks.

This was a precaution taken 20 years ago when we were working with stone knives and bear skins, as our load test operator would say.

If the model shouldn’t have access to the internet, put it on a network without access to the internet.

it's really interesting how they seemingly don't have a way to pause runs? like a P0 that would page an employee, shouldn't that pause the run and then make it into a decision on whether to let it continue vs that whole "run was killed" 2.5 hours later?

A full hugging face timeline would surely make them look terrible.