Yes, /dev/(u)random is supposed to do that, but what if there’s a bug in the kernel which causes /dev/(u)ramdom to be less than secure? There’s also issues where, for example, it may no longer be possible to read /dev/(u)random after putting the process in a chroot() sandbox (chroot() isn’t defined in POSIX so its behavior is not guaranteed to be consistent across multiple operating systems).

getrandom() is often times suggested, but alas isn’t a standardized function, i.e. it’s not part of the POSIX specification. Considering how the C23 changes to the C specification caused a lot of perfectly good C code to no longer compile, I’m very anal about sticking to specs; I use '-std=C99' for my code these days (even though it can compile as C23 code) and stick to POSIX functions (except chroot() and setgroups(), but both of those predate POSIX, and even here I have a compile-time option to compile my code without those non-POSIX syscalls).

The code using a secure XOF (the algorithm was developed by the same team which later on made SHA-3, and includes people who helped make AES) has been around for nearly two decades (the code where I roll my own RNG to make secure random numbers has been around for over 25 years, but used AES before XOFs existed) and not one security problem has found with the RNG code has ever been found. [1] “Don’t roll your own RNG” is a suggestion, but it is possible to do so securely if one knows what they are doing (i.e. they have read Applied Cryptography and keep current with cryptographic developments).

For anything vibe coded (my code is 100% human written, for the record), rolling one’s own RNG is a really bad idea.

[1] There was a theoretical issue with cache timing attacks over two decades ago, so I put mitigations in place, and then chose to use an XOF for newer code.

[2] There was an issue where a separate implementation I made of this XOF would generate incorrect test vectors in clang, but only at some optimization levels. I now test the XOF in both GCC and clang at multiple optimization levels to make sure it acts correctly.

▲ boltzmann64 33 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

i remember some linux kernel dev got ousted by the community because he/she wanted to not implement a backdoor that would compromise the results of /dev/urandom.

	▲	akerl_ 3 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Who?

▲ sltkr 32 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> getrandom() is often times suggested, but alas isn’t a standardized function

The POSIX standard function is getentropy(), which internally calls getrandom() on Linux.

> what if there’s a bug in the kernel which causes /dev/(u)ramdom to be less than secure?

It's often the other way around: the Linux kernel contains thousands of workarounds for buggy hardware, while the buggy hardware itself doesn't always get patched. Linux developers take this stuff very seriously. As a result it's often safer to rely on kernel APIs than to access the hardware directly.

The kernel code involving random number generation receives an exceptionally high amount of scrutiny because of its security implications, so I'd trust it to do the right thing over a naked call to RDRAND which nobody knows how exactly it's implemented in proprietary hardware or a handrolled solution to mix the RDRAND output with other entropy sources.

Remember the Debian openssl disaster from 2008? That happened exactly because someone had handrolled their entropy mixing solution, then someone else broke it.

	▲	strenholme 11 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		From https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9799919799/functions/g... “The intended use of this function is to create a seed for other pseudo-random number generators” So, if I were to use genentropy() in a POSIX-compliant way, I would need to do what I already do: Use my own pseudo-random number generator. The Debian openssl disaster (CVE 2008-0166, I remember it well) was caused because someone incorrectly patched secure code: Since the code used uninitialized memory as one of many entropy sources, which causes Valgrind to complain, they patched the code to not use uninitialized memory for entropy, but then accidentally disabled all other sources of entropy (except the 16-bit PID). It was caused because the person making the patch didn’t fully understand why it was a good idea to, in that context, use code which Valgrind complained about. [1] As an aside, here’s how I deal with those Valgrind errors: `#ifdef VALGRIND_NOERRORS /* Valgrind reports our intentional use of values of uncleared * allocated memory as one source of entropy as an error, so we * allow it to be disabled for Valgrind testing / memset(noise,0,512); #endif / VALGRIND_NOERRORS */` I do believe the Linux Kernel does have secure RNG code, but I also write code which has run on a lot of different systems and environments, including embedded ones, and some of them might not have a secure /dev/urandom. [1] Debian has a lot of inflexible policies like this which can cause problems. Another issue Debian has is they have a policy a given piece of code must always compile to the same binary on a given architecture. That isn’t true with the unpatched version of my code, because the hash compression routine uses a 32-bit random number generated at compile time to avoid hash collision attacks (it also uses another 32-bit random number at runtime, and I make sure the hash compression values are never visible). So the Debian version of my code was forced to be patched to be less secure.

▲ NooneAtAll3 43 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

> but what if there’s a bug in the kernel which causes /dev/(u)ramdom to be less than secure?

so instead you suggest trusting your own untested unlooked at implementation more?

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strenholme 34 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Black-and-white thinking like this is always inaccurate.

>untested

The automated tests includes tests that make sure the XOF is correctly implemented. [1]

>unlooked at

People have been looking at my code for security holes for well over 20 years, and I have been getting multiple AI assisted security reports over the last year, things like “there’s a buffer overflow in this code which is nay to impossible to exploit, using code which hasn’t even been able to compile since 2022”.

[1] https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu... and https://github.com/samboy/MaraDNS/tree/master/deadwood-githu...

	▲	SideQuark 3 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		XOF correctly implemented doesn’t ensure you haven’t made other mistakes, such as using entropy sources correctly, doing needed math correctly to avoid any entropy bias, etc. etc…. You’re correct about black and white thinking. Then you invoke multiple straw men in this thread to defend that you’ll roll your own. Disclaimer: I’ve been hired for multiple DoD projects to break hardware and software security systems, and I nearly always succeed, because so many people (and companies) roll their own.

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UnlockedSecrets 36 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

No you see what we do, Is we ask Claude to make no mistakes in implementing the CSPRNG. This way we ensure there are no mistakes in the implementation or mathematics.

https://xkcd.com/221/