The main reason is there are alternative paths where neither were required. Japan was already fishing around for diplomatic end to the war with the major sticking point being conditional vs unconditional surrender and their main condition iirc was protection for the Emperor which the US ended up not messing with significantly anyways (at least in terms of execution for various war crimes committed by Imperial Japanese forces). That's usually the main argument I see and honestly I see the points there, Japan really was putting out fairly significant feelers about a possible negotiated end to the war before the Soviet Union was able to pivot to the Far East theater.

We'll never /really/ know what the outcome of a negotiated peace would have looked like since it was obviated so soon after it started by the bombing and Japan's unconditional surrender afterwards. We don't really know how much that path would differ from the outcome of the unconditional surrender turned out to be. The main point is it's not an either or situation between bomb and the bloody full on land invasion scenarios as presented by the bomb apologist [0] camp.

[0] I mean this in the neutral dictionary sense of simply "one that defends a controversial position", just to clarify.

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opo 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

>The main reason is there are alternative paths where neither were required. Japan was already fishing around for diplomatic end to the war with the major sticking point being conditional vs unconditional surrender and their main condition iirc was protection for the Emperor ...

This is not true. While there were peace feelers put out by the civilian members of the Big 6, the military hardliners blocked each of them. (Most accounts also state that part of their conditions would be to be given the islands in the South Pacific that the allies had just conquered.)

Even AFTER an atomic bomb had been dropped, the military had unacceptable demands:

>...Three members held out for three additional terms: Army Minister General Korechika Anami and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, General Yoshijiro Umezu, and Navy, Admiral Soemu Toyoda. These additional terms included: 1) Japan would disarm her own forces; 2) Japan would conduct any “so-called” war crimes trials of her own nationals; and 3) there would be no occupation of Japan. This last term would assure the continuance of the Imperial system and Hirohito’s seat on the throne. These positions would be referred to as the “one condition” and the “four condition” Japanese peace terms. Under the Japanese governing system, however, the Big Six could only act when unanimous. With a three to three split, they were deadlocked.

It was at this point that Hirohito intervened:

>...At the end of the theatrical demonstration of the deadlock, the emperor spoke. He stated he had given serious consideration to the situation at home and aboard. He then announced his support of the “one condition” offer. He and Japan must “bear the unbearable.” The Big Six and later the full cabinet made Hirohito’s decision official government policy. The American and Allied reply accepted the Japanese surrender offer, except that it stated clearly that the emperor would be subordinate to the occupation commander. This produced another dispute as to whether Japan could accept these terms. The emperor intervened again to announce he was satisfied with the American cable.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/japans-surren...

Even after all this, hardline military officers attempted a violent military coup to destroy the Emperor's recorded surrender broadcast and keep the war going.

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rtkwe 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I talk in more (somewhat ramble-y) detail here [0], but I think I can put a more succinct version of the anti argument here, the main argument is that to morally justify the extreme act dropping atomic bombs on those cities requires an extreme set of justifications to the level of "it was the only option short of a bloody millions dead between both sides home island invasion" that history doesn't necessarily support.

The core thrust that undermines the this or that between bombs and traditional invasion justification for dropping the bombs is that a) the Emperor was already exploring possible peace deals and b) ultimately the Emperor was able to override the extreme militarists in the war council and accept the peace after the bombs. A lot of the pro-moral-bomb argument presupposes that the shock and awe of the atomic bombs were a prerequisite for the change in stance and that anything short of a full invasion of the home islands would not achieve shift large enough to get to a peace deal. (and that to achieve that impact required them to be used on a city)

Ultimately I think (and I know this is extremely hard to prove ahistorically) a naval blockade and shelling/arial campaign that devastated what little military might Japan had left would have lead to the same shift as the bombs and that the casualties from that would be lower or at least less morally weighted as the intentional atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When that shift would happen and how to weigh the deaths morally are going to vary a lot from person to person though and I accept that.

> Even after all this, hardline military officers attempted a violent military coup to destroy the Emperor's recorded surrender broadcast and keep the war going.

A coup that ultimately fails though. I don't think anyone really argues that there weren't fanatical elements remaining even after the bombs were dropped. Their existence doesn't mean peace required the bombs however, the big question is what were the conditions that would reduce their power to the point the peace could be accepted. We have one example in the bombing but that doesn't mean that was the only option.

[0] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49757977

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hylaride 40 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

I personally subscribe to the theory that nuking Japan (at least once) probably stopped the need for an invasion. Almost all of the archives that were sifted through pretty much answers the fact that the Japanese were never going to negotiate a peace that removed its militant aspects otherwise. There would likely have been another war and Japan wouldn't have become democratic.

The 2nd bomb? I can be convinced either way. Japan needed to know they had more than one, but it probably didn't have to be a city. That being said, this is a lot of presentism (looking at the past with modern ethics). World War Two was a brutal, total war and the long term effects of nuclear weapons were not fully understood. Remember that there was carpet bombing with incendiary bombs happening against Japan's wooden cities for the year leading up to this. A non-nuclear end the the war would almost certainly have involved a land invasion and many, many more deaths on all sides.

Japan (as a country) was also not innocent in all this. They started the war - both with China and the USA. The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind...

	▲	FireHorseAutumn 10 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		It's complicated because Japan, then and now: 1) is a place where symbolic and actual authority are two very different things. 2) is a place where outward consensus is prioritized. Heavily. After the fall of Tojo in the middle of 1944, the cabinet which regained a modest degree of civilian control was split between those who wanted to surrender with one condition (the kokutai gets preserved in some form-this is what Truman eventually agreed to) and those who wanted to surrender, but with several conditions-they handle their own war crimes trials, all kinds of unrealistic stuff. The thing is: the Soviet invasion of Manchuria, the atomic bombings, the potential social unrest, it all happened within the space of a week. It's frankly a bit bizarre to suggest that one and only one of these played a role in the Japanese decision to surrender, especially given the structure of their government. It probably all combined together at once. And even this led to the Kyujo incident. >The Japanese military IN COLD BLOOD slaughtered more civilians than the Allies did in all their strategic bombings, let alone just nuclear. Even the nuclear bombs had military targets in mind... Operation Meetinghouse killed more than the atomic bombs did. And the Soviets-quite literally-raped, murdered, and looted their way through Manchuria to the point where anti-Soviet demonstrations in multiple Chinese cities became very difficult for the KMT regime to control. The Americans would pardon Shiro Ishii, the Soviets would put several Unit 731 goons to work on their own human experimentation program at Sverdlovsk. And these were the relative good guys. So, yeah: it was a dark time in human history. Ultimately, the decision to use the atomic bombs can't be separated from the decision to press for unconditional surrender of some kind. You could genuinely make the argument that Roosevelt was careless in applying something meant for Germany and its history to a completely different country with different pathologies, and it is certainly true that a "placated" Stalin, a strong pro-US nationalist China, a demilitarized irrelevant Japan, and a decolonized Asia were four goals that were never going to be compatible. But it didn't really matter for Truman, one of the few American Presidents who knew what war actually was-WWI as well as being descended from the losers in the Civil War-and someone who barely had the legitimacy needed to agree to keeping the kokutai after the atomic bombings. I think their usage was inevitable by 1945. Those incandescent with rage from 80 years later miss the forest for the trees.

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opo 30 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

>...Ultimately I think (and I know this is extremely hard to prove ahistorically) a naval blockade and shelling/arial campaign that devastated what little military might Japan had left would have lead to the same shift as the bombs and that the casualties from that would be lower or at least less morally weighted as the intentional atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

A full blockade would have led to many more deaths due to famine, etc.

The last major battle before the dropping of the atomic bombs was the battle for Okinawa and it was the bloodiest and fiercest battle fought against the Japanese. Absolutely no one who knew about that battle would have claimed that Japan was already defeated.

>...When the guns fell silent, more than 240,000 people had lost their lives in the campaign for Okinawa. The American loss rate was 35 percent of the force, totaling 49,151 casualties.

>...So close to the home islands, most Japanese soldiers refused to surrender and fought to the death. Their fanaticism contributed to a dreadful toll. Some 110,000 Japanese and conscripted Okinawan defenders were killed in action.

https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/okinawa-costs...

Japan had every intention of defending the main islands just as strong, or stronger, starting with operation Ketsu-Go. One of the slogans in Japan in 1945 was "The sooner the Americans come, the better...One hundred million die proudly."

https://irp.fas.org/eprint/arens/chap4.htm

The proposed allied invasion was planned to have 42 aircraft carriers, 24 battleships, and 400 destroyers and destroyer escorts. Please take a moment to try and picture that armada... Yet even with an armada of that size, that wasn't considered enough!

>...Ken Nichols, the District Engineer of the Manhattan Engineer District, wrote that at the beginning of August 1945, "[p]lanning for the invasion of the main Japanese home islands had reached its final stages, and if the landings actually took place, we might supply about fifteen atomic bombs to support the troops."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

One thing they would have been facing was a massive kamikaze force:

>...Estimates of how many would have been available vary, but range between 5,000 and 7,000; plans for waves of 1,000 planes were in place. Both sides planned for higher-than-normal success rates since the invasion would greatly reduce problems of finding targets ("fly to the shore, hang a right, find a transport") and the vulnerable transports would be concentrated near shore in order to offload troops. These weren't the only suicide attackers. The navy had midget submarines and frogmen who would attack the landing craft with explosive charges. Civilians were formally "drafted" into defense units, most of which had no military weapons or uniform, and which had been instructed to attack with bamboo spears or hand tools. There's no way to tell whether such units would have had any positive effect - but their inclusion would almost guarantee that US troops would fire on civilians, with the potential for mass slaughter.

https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/4ka1z1/what_...

A Japanese military officer summed up the thinking by the Japanese military this way:

>...We will prepare 10,000 planes to meet the landing of the enemy. We will mobilize every aircraft possible, both training and "special attack" planes. We will smash one third of the enemy's war potential with this air force at sea. Another third will also be smashed at sea by our warships, human torpedoes and other special weapons. Furthermore, when the enemy actually lands, if we are ready to sacrifice a million men we will be able to inflict an equal number of casualties upon them. If the enemy loses a million men, then the public opinion in America will become inclined towards peace, and Japan will be able to gain peace with comparatively advantageous conditions.

https://irp.fas.org/eprint/arens/chap4.htm

>We have one example in the bombing but that doesn't mean that was the only option.

Yes, besides the atomic bombs there could have been an invasion or a blockade. Both of these options would have resulted in more deaths on both sides.

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WarmWash 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I think this single image from 1945 captures everything about the situation with Japan at the time, and what went into the decision making.[1]

[1]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volunteer_Fighting_Corps#/medi...

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rtkwe 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

I think very few people on the anti-bomb side would seriously argue there wasn't a split in the Imperial government and a lot of preparation going into defending against a potential US invasion attempt. At the same time however there were the beginning of diplomatic efforts to explore a negotiated peace from minority factions in the Japanese government partially backed by the Emperor, these (to me) undermine the "it was the only option" argument supporting the bombings morally. I found this article that talks a bit about the feelers (even though it gets side tracked about a supposed early-1945 prototypical peace "offer" that closely matched the eventual status post war, though that's an interesting read and an important bit of info about how to treat and examine reports of things like that). [0]

The main thrust of the anti-moral-bombing argument is essentially that the MAGIC intercepts we know happened for sure of their early diplomatic feelers indicate that the Emperor and some minority factions were beginning to develop the terms for a possible surrender and that combined with the main reasons for the US bombing not being directly oriented towards defeating Japan but were already looking to their next adversary, the USSR, weakens the argument that the bombing was ultimately more moral way of ending the war. We know for sure from Truman et al's own writings at the time show that their only concern wasn't the least bloody end of the war with Japan and they wanted to demonstrate the bomb to the USSR, I think that's pretty undisputed history even by the pro-moral-bombing side of the argument.

I tend to agree that it's unlikely Japan would have been able to stand up to a US blockade when we were already able to safely park battleships off their coast before the bombs were dropped and ultimately the Supreme War Council would have been overruled by the Emperor the same way they were after the atomic bombs were dropped. How quickly would the pro-negotiation side have gained power with a blockade of the home islands? That would have been a pretty safe operation for the US at the time.

The biggest question marks in the whole thing are largely impossible to answer how many more defeats would the militarist side have to suffer before accepting a surrender that looks like the eventual post war status. The insistence on unconditional surrender is also a thing that's difficult to weigh morally. If the US insists on a condition it knows is unacceptable how much does that shift the moral blame for Japan not accepting the ultimatum of an "unacceptable" condition or bomb?

Sorry if it's a bit jumbled, I'm bouncing between work and this and I'm not a great essayist to begin with.

Too long; You rambled too much there in the middle: the main argument of the antibomb remains that it's unlikely that a full or even partial invasion of the home islands would have been ultimately required and the atomic bombing of civilians is so morally bad that it requires an iron clad "there was no other option to end the war" (or the only alternatives were far bloodier; eg a full home island invasion) which the Japanese feelers about negotiating a peace undermines.

I think ultimately if we could part the curtains of time for both sides and show the post war outcome to both sides Japan would have accepted a surrender that lead to that future.

[0] https://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2022/05/06/did-the-japanese-...

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opo 4 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

>...We know for sure from Truman et al's own writings at the time show that their only concern wasn't the least bloody end of the war with Japan and they wanted to demonstrate the bomb to the USSR, I think that's pretty undisputed history even by the pro-moral-bombing side of the argument.

There is very little evidence of this. Truman's own writings at time (or later) never mention this idea.

This idea that Truman decided to drop the bomb to impress the Soviets was popularized later. It even has an analysis in the Reddit BadHistory subreddit:

https://www.reddit.com/r/badhistory/comments/1z07v8/deconstr...

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fn-mote 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Thank you for the post.

> Too long; You rambled too much there in the middle […]

Is this Claude’s suggestions for editing your post??

	▲	rtkwe 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Nah, that whole thing is pure human. I originally had simple "tl;dr" but this felt more true and acknowledging of my poor self editing/thought organizing plus a little self deprecating. [0] Somethings that smell of llm speak are common in their output because the llms are mirroring human writing patterns after all. The only LLM sourced thing in there is I found the nuclear secrecy blog post in a citation link but I then read it myself to try to avoid cherry picking a portion of an article that ultimately shut down my own argument. [0] eta: Also I thought some people might take tl;dr offensively so softened it with the self deprication.

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vasco 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Should Japan have A-bombed the US then? https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/what-am...

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Teever 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

If nuking Japan wasn't necessary and excessive then why didn't they surrender after the first nuke was dropped?

	▲	rtkwe an hour ago \| parent [-]
		3-days is a pretty short time for such a major shift in politics for starters. Would a 3rd or 4th have been justified in the 6 day gap before their August 15th surrender announcement if the US had had them available? Also the justification for the second bomb, that it was required to demonstrate it wasn't a one off doesn't require the that bomb be dropped on a second city either. The main thrust isn't that the bombs weren't effective it's that the extreme nature of the act requires extreme justification bordering on it being the only option but for a bloody home island invasion. See my other long posts about the anti-moral-bomb argument in this thread, I don't want to duplicate them here to avoid spamming the thread.

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daedrdev 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

No this is apologizing for a fascist and suicidal regime. One day people will make this claim about Russia in their current Ukraine war even though it’s painfully obvious Russia is not seeking an actual diplomatic solution, and I will view them with the same distain as I view you now

	▲	bigyabai 2 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		> One day people will make this claim about Russia in their current Ukraine war They might, it would be a sore excuse to nuke Russian territory or bomb Moscow a-la Dresden in 1945. The fact that Americans cannot imagine resolution to war without nuclear violence is exactly how Crimea was annexed and lost. If you ignore proportionality, then your adversary can test your patience and win every time. This is why asymmetric warfare is so popular in Russia and China, and why it pisses off Americans so consistently. Nuclear weapons give nations a false sense of security, it doesn't protect you against subtle escalation like widespread corporate hacking, political blackmail, proxy conflicts, border harassment or industrial overmatch.
	▲	rtkwe 2 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		The complicating part to that is there's not the same Supreme War Council populated by militarists vs the Emperor split in modern Russia, there's just Putin. To match scenarios there would have to be an oligarch council in Russia pushing continuing the war while Putin put out feelers and that's not what's happening. Also nothing about the anti-moral-bomb argument hinges on apologetics for Japanese actions just arguments that the bombs were unnecessary to achieve the end to the war. The only assumption is that there was some set of conditions and peace deal short of the two bombs that would lead to the emperor overriding the war council and surrendering.