Passkey on NFC/USB hardware token (x2)

They're cheap enough if you lose one it's not the end of the world. Goes on your keyring. Doesn't require esim management. Use NFC swipe/usb-plug-in + pin to use.

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limagnolia an hour ago | parent | next [-]

The problem with hardware tokens is that they 1) Only store a limited number of logins, 2) It is very difficult to keep them in sync- every time you need to add a passkey, you have to get them both out, which makes it difficult to keep one a in a secure safe to keep it safe from damage/loss

This two fatal flaws are what limits their usefulness to enterprise SSO and perhaps some other limited uses where the organization has the ability to replace tokens. (Even in a distributed enterprise, enterprise SSO may not be a good fit for hardware tokens, if they can't get replacements out to employees fast enough).

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pavel_lishin 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

The problem isn't the cost of replacing it, the problem is - how do you log in when all your passkey-bearing devices just got flushed down the toilet?

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remix2000 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

How is that different from accidentally deleting your keepass database? Or forgetting your password? I think it’d be easier for me to forget than find myself trying to flush all my hw tokens…

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pavel_lishin an hour ago | parent [-]

I can back up my keepass database, and I can write down my passwords.

	▲	remix2000 7 minutes ago \| parent \| next [-]
		I can get another hw key (if one of mine breaks, which I, surprisingly enough, have not yet managed to achieve) And since I have at least two at all times, the possibility of one of them breaking changes… not much really. Paper can burn or get tossed, backups files can go corrupt, and I really don't understand what is that extra risk hw keys introduce… There is at least one valid (in my opinion) reason to not like hw keys though: they cost real money to acquire, so you probably want an extra margin in your budget for the unlikely case they indeed decide to break.
	▲	faust201 an hour ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		Same way. A majority generally have a old phone that was already signed in to google. Or if they remember only Apple ID and password (one very difficult password) + sms. They can login on to a new phone. Everything is SYNCED immediately. What if you have a ransomeware that destroy everything on the same day your house and all backups burn down. And you cant get it from immutable backups as you wrote that decryption key in paper. And the bank will not allow you to access it as the govt deported you elsewhere.
	▲	megous an hour ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		I can back up my FIDO2 (non-)resident keys too. In the end it's just a piece of HW with some secret material inside. non-resident FIDO2 keys are easier to back up, because the master secret seed is fixed and shared for all origins and there's nothing stored on the key.

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vablings an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Copy pasting my other comment from an earlier thread

FIDO2 USB Security key -> Bitwarden (With master password) -> Every other method (topt/password)

I have 3 FIDO2 USB Security keys, One I carry with my persons at all times, one that stays with my main machine at all times and an offsite backup that is sitting in a friend's server, if my house burns down, I can either physically collect the key or use USB-IP to authenticate back into bitwarden and enroll a new key. (Actually all 3 are at home right now but that's ok)

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vel0city 14 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Its going to be hard to flush my desktop and my laptop down the toilet.

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faust201 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-]

But a majority don't do that. For them let them use passkeys. If the possibility is once in 10 years then I am happy to do that. A majority is happy to do that.

And yes, Google or Apple - dont say you should not keep passwords in your database and sync it with dropbox. DIY.

Rest of us want convenience.

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an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

[deleted]

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lxgr 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Enrolling two devices stored in different locations for every sign up is extremely annoying.

I suspect that most people that ostensibly do this actually only enroll one for non-critical accounts and then depend on some fallback mechanism.

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iamnothere an hour ago | parent [-]

This is a legitimate problem, and one of the few cases where a third party login provider makes sense, at least for non-critical “apps”. If both tokens can be authorized to that provider, then you don’t need to enroll any more tokens for apps using that provider. The difficulty is creating a trustworthy provider system without weakening security (the provider shouldn’t be able to login without you) that doesn’t collect information about you and which can’t lock you out from all your accounts.

I’m not sure what work has been done on this since Mozilla Persona. I certainly wouldn’t want Google and Apple, or governments, to be the sole gatekeepers.

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lxgr an hour ago | parent [-]

Why would you choose that over a synchronizing passkey manager?

A third party OAuth provider puts you at the mercy of the service provider, the other can work fully on your client side even if the app provider were to disappear tomorrow.

The only advantage I can think of is that you have a centralized place to revoke credentials in case your password manager does get compromised.

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iamnothere an hour ago | parent | next [-]

> Why would you choose that over a synchronizing passkey manager?

No second factor, compromised passkey manager leads to compromise of all accounts. This is a huge problem.

> A third party OAuth provider puts you at the mercy of the service provider, the other can work fully on your client side even if the app provider were to disappear tomorrow.

Yes that’s what I was saying, it needs some thought and careful work. It would need to be decentralized, and I’m not sure that current standards are up to the task.

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UltraSane 41 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

"A third party OAuth provider puts you at the mercy of the service provider" This is they key issue with trusting a third party to manage my passkeys, they can also BLOCK them and lock me out. An exception is if the passkeys are synced to all your devices and cannot be remotely wiped. I think this is how Apple works.

	▲	iamnothere 31 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		I didn’t think of this in the moment, but you’re right, this is an even bigger risk than compromise. There’s regularly a thread here about someone getting locked out of their cloud accounts, and now we’re going to gate everything behind those same accounts? Horrible idea.