| ▲ | Manuel_D 5 hours ago | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
Again, you keep citing decisions without bothering to understand the context behind the. For instance, "To the contrary, “what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Katz, 389 U. S., at 351–352. A majority of this Court has already recognized that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements. Jones, 565 U. S., at 430 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment);" This is about the police planting a GPS tracker on someone's car - that's that "Jones" is referring to here. That case involved the police tracking someone in public and in private. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| ▲ | text0404 4 hours ago | parent [-] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||
You're confusing the technology used in Jones with the principle Carpenter cited it for: a person can have a 4A privacy interest in the whole of their physical movements, including movements in public. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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