No, for the fifth time, Chatrie and Carpenter dealt with private cell phone location information. This is not the exact same subject matter at all.

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text0404 5 hours ago | parent [-]

The specific technology being used to conduct the searches does not matter.

Persistent technological tracking of a person's public movements can constitute a search. The fact that each individual movement occurs in public does not automatically eliminate fourth amendment protection, nor does it matter that its a third party that does the collecting (Google, Flock, whoever). What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data.

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Manuel_D 5 hours ago | parent [-]

It's not just the specific technology being used to conduct the search, it's that the information the police obtained Chatrie and in Carpender both included people's private movements. Your phone's GPS data doesn't just track where you drive on public roads, it also tracks you walking around your private property.

> The fact that each individual movement occurs in public does not automatically eliminate fourth amendment protection, nor does it matter that its a third party that does the collecting (Google, Flock, whoever).

Sure, doesn't eliminate Fourth Amendment protections: the police can't just search your car because it's in public. But that doesn't meant police can't record public spaces.

> What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data.

Recording public spaces isn't a Fourth Amendment search. That's what distinguishes Flock from the other cases you mentioned.

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text0404 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Carpenter is saying that public movements are part of the protected interest, not just the private movements which were also tracked. If the private movements hadn't been tracked in those cases, it would still be a 4A issue:

"A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere. To the contrary, 'what [one] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.'"

> But that doesn't meant police can't record public spaces.

> Recording public spaces isn't a Fourth Amendment search.

I'm not saying either of these things. The quote that you're responding to literally says "What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data". I don't care who collects the data (Flock, or Axon, or Google, or whoever): if the cops are searching a persistent database which monitors and tracks people over time, it is a 4A issue.

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Manuel_D 3 hours ago | parent [-]

This is just an incorrect description of the ruling in Carpenter v. US. The core of the ruling is that the third-party doctrine doesn't apply to cell phone location data. The ruling was a very narrow one and did not affect other methods of monitoring.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carpenter_v._United_States

> The Supreme Court's ruling in Carpenter was narrow and did not otherwise change the third-party doctrine related to other business records that might incidentally reveal location information, nor did it overrule prior decisions concerning conventional surveillance techniques and tools such as security cameras.

You're trying to expand the scope of the decision on Carpenter to encompasses video cameras, or location tracking in general, but that is not true.

> The quote that you're responding to literally says "What matters is that LE is conducting fourth amendment searches using that data".

No, it does not. It says that public activity may be protected, not that it is protected. And you're conveniently ignoring the fact that this decision was narrowly scoped to the context of phone location data.

> if the cops are searching a persistent database which monitors and tracks people over time, it is a 4A issue.

Carpenter only established this in the context of phone location information. You're inventing your own decision when you try to expand this to public facing cameras.

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text0404 2 hours ago | parent [-]

I'm not talking about the specific ruling, I'm quoting the justification that the justices used in coming to that ruling, which is extremely relevant to modern day surveillance and whether LE using surveillance cameras from a third party to reconstruct people's movements constitutes unreasonable searches under 4A. Based on their arguments, it appears so.

> nor did it overrule prior decisions

I'm not saying it overruled prior decisions. I'm saying the reasoning of the judges has an effect on future surveillance technologies.

> You're trying to expand the scope of the decision on Carpenter to encompasses video cameras, or location tracking in general, but that is not true.

No, I'm saying that the same principles that led to the outcome of Carpenter also apply to technologically-assisted tracking (which includes LE using surveillance cameras to track movements over time).

	▲	Manuel_D 2 hours ago \| parent [-]
		> No, I'm saying that the same principles that led to the outcome of Carpenter also apply to technologically-assisted tracking (which includes LE using surveillance cameras to track movements over time). And this is just a factually wrong statement about the Carpenter decision. The Supreme Court didn't apply the same principles to other methods of surveillance. They could have. But they did not, and instead gave a narrowly scoped decision that was limited to cell phone location data. What you think the Supreme Court should have decided is irrelevant.