I've experienced this "solved problem" when visiting Germany during COVID. On every entrance to a mall there was somebody with a scanner device, and they only let you in if the scanner showed a green mark. I've been fully vaccinated (not EU) but my code didn't show a green mark on their scanner and I was promptly denied entry. The solution was to show them my German friend's code on my phone, this registered just fine, so I could enter anywhere.

So the whole "eID/CAs/ZKP/PKI" mumbo jumbo can be easily fooled by a gif file.

▲ benregenspan an hour ago | parent | next [-]

That part seems to qualify as an unsolved problem. But could anyone have taken the scanned data (or the GIF file) and used it to open a bank account in your friend's name? That seems like the main issue that is genuinely solved by correct implementation of this type of system.

	▲	maratc an hour ago \| parent [-]
		Already today nobody can open a bank account in my name with just a picture of my passport, as the original would be required. My passport doesn't have any of the "eID/CAs/ZKP/PKI", so the question of "what exactly the addition of it solves" remains open. My national ID card supposedly has some of it, the 17-year olds who want to pass as 18-year olds usually show a doctored gif file of their ID card, with a year of birth one or two years before the actual one; this works in ~98% of the cases.

▲ pas an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

yes, just as age verification can be fooled by an older friend who gets the check mark.

	▲	maratc an hour ago \| parent [-]
		Reminds me of `If you think cryptography can solve your problem, you don’t understand your problem and you don’t understand cryptography.` (Bruce Schneier dug into origins of this here: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2026/05/laurie-anders...)