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amluto 5 hours ago

> Linux isn't like macOS, it doesn't have any kind of proper desktop sandboxing architecture that really works.

I’m sorry, what? MacOS’s desktop sandboxing is pathetic. Sure, it kind of sort of tries to prevent an application from rummaging until you give it permission. And that permission is hilariously coarse grained, and it gets regularly broken anyway. (Seriously, read about TCC breaks. They’re not little implementation errors — they’re giant gaping holes in the whole concept.) The entitlement mechanism basically serves to help Apple restrict what developers can do without meaningful protecting Apple’s users.

If you think that it protects you when your Mac prompts to ask whether Terminal.app may access Documents, you are welcome to enjoy your warm fuzzy feelings.

> Unfortunately implementing an Apple style architecture on Linux would be very difficult.

Why would it be difficult? I think that mostly it would reveal to whomever implemented it how useless it is.

If you mean sandbox-exec, you can do this on Linux, too. And the Linux mechanisms are not considered deprecated and undocumented, whereas Apple steadfastly refuses admit that sandbox-exec is a real mechanism.

mike_hearn 4 hours ago | parent | next [-]

There can be exploits in any security system but the architecture is sound. There's no equivalent of TCC on Linux (I mean one that really sticks), and no easy way to create one.

The sandboxing isn't bad. It's obviously weaker if you do everything in the Terminal and stay in old-school UNIX territory because it wasn't designed to sandbox developer workloads. But it's a lot better than nothing, which is what Linux offers.

The OS does actually protect you when it asks if the terminal should be able to access ~/Documents. You can say no, and then random stuff you curl|bash can't read files in that folder unless there's an exploit. Apps that opt in to app sandboxing are much better protected and can store files/settings in an area of $HOME that other apps can't access at all without the right permissions.

It would be difficult to do on Linux because an Apple style architecture requires apps to systematically use the blessed OS APIs for functionality. Not only for things like file pickers but also camera access, storing preferences, etc. In Linux it'd require the architecture to be tied to a specific desktop environment and associated set of apps. There's not enough consistency otherwise.

It also needs pervasive kernel enforced app identity and equivalents to Apple's bookmarks, Mach context propagation, SBPL, app containers architecture etc.

It also needs an agreed on way to handle malware reporting and detection, out of the box, and some authority that's trusted to hand out sensitive permissions (for writing debuggers, if nothing else).

You can hack something together with bits and pieces Linux has, and define a way to write apps that delivers something like Apple's architecture - as Android has - but that won't bring the ecosystem with you. And it will suffer from a high degree of centralization where distributors have to approve every app, with any app you get outside your distro's package repositories being a free for all. Apple's architecture allows apps to be distributed outside the app store while still being sandboxed to a lesser or greater extent, as well as scanned for malware ahead of time and located anywhere on disk (by extension, you can have >1 version of an app installed at once and sandboxing still works).

drnick1 25 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

> The OS does actually protect you when it asks if the terminal should be able to access ~/Documents. You can say no, and then random stuff you curl|bash can't read files in that folder unless there's an exploit.

How is that different from creating a new user to run that script? This has been the standard practice on Linux for decades, and it is how I run tools like Codex and Claude on my machine. I wouldn't allow AI tools access to files, mount points, etc, owned by my main user.

This works best for terminal apps; for GUI apps such as Steam and games where running a separate graphical session isn't practical, you can use bubblewrap.

lrvick 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

Mac users always like to defend some of the things Apple legitimately got right over most Linux distros, but always ignore that supply chain security and standard package management security on Apple (Homebrew) is akin to giving a bunch of internet randos root access to your machine with no oversight, vetting, or code review of any kind. At least most Linux distros do basic package signing.

Someone even thinking it is reasonable to try to use a mac to manage production would be grounds for me to ensure they never have production access.

Also, QubesOS is a thing, therefore QubesOS Linux users have way way better access to sandboxing than MacOS -and- signed devtools packages.

amluto 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

> The OS does actually protect you when it asks if the terminal should be able to access ~/Documents. You can say no, and then random stuff you curl|bash can't read files in that folder unless there's an exploit.

If you say no, you can’t use less or cat to read your documents. If you say yes then you are completely unprotected, forever, from anything you might run from the terminal.

> It also needs pervasive kernel enforced app identity

Doing like MacOS needs app identity. But this model is just wrong, because it answers the wrong question. Determining, once, whether Microsoft Word or VSCode may access all your documents, means that any Word document, using valid scripting or an exploit against Word, may access all your documents, and it means that you are fully exposed to anything you look at in vscode (as vscode has almost no security).

The right questions would be: May this document access this file or folder? May this project access anything outside its own folder? May this Python script read your screen? May this AI agent session access this USB device? Kernel-managed app identity is completely unhelpful for any of this.

(Frankly, kernel managed app identity seems unnecessary for most of what Mac does, too. App identity could be set by whatever launches the app, so long as the app’s resulting privileges are not allowed to exceed those of the launcher.)

> And it will suffer from a high degree of centralization where distributors have to approve every app

Please elaborate.

Sure, if you actually think that an Apple-like entitlement system protects you well, then I guess that a non-Apple entitlement system would need some trusted authority to grant entitlements. I do not think it protects anyone very well even if Apple, as the entitlement granter, is considered fully trustworthy.

inigyou 3 hours ago | parent [-]

The right right question would be: why aren't we enforcing a document to be self-contained? Why are documents agents? Why can any document access anything or indeed, do anything? That's not a document, that's a program!

amluto 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Documents containing scripts are genuinely useful, as are, say, Python programs.

inigyou 2 hours ago | parent [-]

A python program isn't a word document

amluto an hour ago | parent [-]

People write real software using Microsoft Office's scripting features. Sure, it's not "cool" the way that Python is cool, but it works.

And neither Microsoft nor Python has a credible security model.

KaiserPro 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I mean SElinux plus cgroups is probably good enough. Although as soon as it talks to the desktop environment all bets are off.

amluto 23 minutes ago | parent [-]

In my personal opinion, SELinux is a rather poor design, and I find that it actively gets in the way of trying to do security well.