Reproducible builds and bootstrapping doesn't stop physical extortion of shipping a new compromised version either.

Sure it does, if you deterministically full source bootstrap, build, and sign the same image m-of-n places with different hardware owned by different people, all of whom only sign if everyone gets identical results, and this can be easily verified with remote attestation at runtime on a running server.

This is not a fantasy. This is exactly how https://caution.co works.

We can cryptographically attest with high confidence what code is running on a remote server at any given moment with these tactics. Entire classes of attacks are taken off the table with this approach, including BGP attacks if deployed properly.

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charcircuit a day ago | parent [-]

You do not need bootstrapping or reproducibility for this. You can do the same thing just with a prebuilt OS and applications.

This is my point. Bootstrapping and reproducibility are made up problems that people think are important but are not actually needed.

	▲	lrvick 19 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Without bootstrapping and reproducibility, you are trusting -one- person to build and sign for everyone else, and hoping their device was not compromised at build time. Single point of failure. Without deterministic full source bootstrapped builds, you cannot verify a build someone else did was not tampered with at build time. I did not say every user reproduces. In practice 2+ _maintainers_ reproduce and sign on behalf of all users, avoiding trust in any single computer or machine.