>We almost had a major backdoor in OpenSSH deployed worldwide, caught at the 11th hour.

Which was not caught by any of the reproducible work people had done. Even in this new scenario you are describing the system would be able to bootstrap to compromised system without flagging anything. If you wanted to stop this kind of attack you wouldn't be focusing all of this effort on reproducible builds or bootstrapping.

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lrvick 2 days ago | parent [-]

The XZ attack was not in version control. It was on the human-built tar files published to Github Releases which no one reviews. Trust in a single person. Distros paranoid about supply chain attacks like stagex build directly from (ideally well reviewed) VCS snapshots for all modern software.

Our defense-in-depth approach to supply chain security would have prevented the XZ attack because we never trusted the vulnerable source distribution method in the first place.

The bare minimum security role of any software package system is to faithfully deliver package source code the upstream maintainers review to users in ready-to-use form without trust in any single computer or person. Sadly no Linux distro hits this bar (except stagex!), so this is a very bad day waiting to happen.

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cyberclimb 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

I thought the attack itself was version controlled via a tracked blob file used in a unit test. I believe the attack was performed by running the test suite (which modified the source code) and then compiling?

If that's the case, then anyone that ran the tests prior to building from source would be vulnerable if my understanding is right

	▲	lrvick a day ago \| parent [-]
		It was in the uploaded tar.gz file to the releases page. The vulnerable code bypassed code review, at least for those distros that trusted the human made source snapshots more than git which was a poor choice.

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charcircuit 2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

The threat actor had access to the source control so he could have just as easily put it there too. Even if you caught it by being so diligent about reviewing it (not many people are in practice), it would not have been caught due to the reproducible builds or bootstrapping work.

	▲	lrvick 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		> The threat actor had access to the source control so he could have just as easily put it there too. And yet they did not because that would be much much higher risk of getting caught, given lots of people pay attention to high-performance-impact code like xz changing, and it would have been obvious in code review .He had to hide it and take advantage of distros being lazy about supply chain trust and modify the code -after- review. Most supply chain attacks in the clear are detected. Suffice to say, it was viable defense for this attack before anyone had seen it used before, that worked as intended. Security engineering is about preventing attacks before they happen. If we normalize full source bootstrapped deterministic and quorum signed builds, then the internet is no longer vulnerable to a $5 wrench attack like it is right now.