> When identity documents are uploaded, they are encrypted using a master encryption key derived from the user’s passkey during authentication.

ONE still sees identity documents in the clear the first time when it verifies them, right? Otherwise we could upload fakes.

Also I'm not familiar with Oauth 2.0, but doesn't ONE know the client and relying party on each verification transaction? So ONE could theoretically store records of who accessed which website, perhaps by mistaken logging configuration or because they were coerced by law enforcement.

Anyway I appreciate the consideration given to privacy.

> ONE still sees identity documents in the clear the first time when it verifies them, right? Otherwise we could upload fakes.

Yes that's correct, the identity documents are validated alongside the selfie before the selfie is discarded and the identity documents are encrypted by the passkey-derived encryption key prior to persistence.

> Also I'm not familiar with Oauth 2.0, but doesn't ONE know the client and relying party on each verification transaction? So ONE could theoretically store records of who accessed which website, perhaps by mistaken logging configuration or because they were coerced by law enforcement.

Yes this is a great callout. ONE does know the client and relying party on each verification transaction and could theoretically store these records (and your point about strict avoidance of logging PII is very important), but implemented properly, identifying the "who" behind a user after initial verification (the coerced by law enforcement example) would require modifying the server or client-side code to capture plaintext during a future passkey-bound decryption. This is also why I have a goal of open sourcing the server side code that processes the plaintext identity payload and running it in an enclave with verifiable attestation.

> Anyway I appreciate the consideration given to privacy.

Thank you! I appreciate the questions.