No, you literally cannot. Synthesizing a stretch of DNA is trivial, and what you can send away for [1].

Building a functional virus is not even remotely a turn-key operation. Assuming you could get the genome, expressing that genome in a way that results in infectious virus is non-trivial.

[1] Even then, the companies will rarely give you long enough reads to make a full genome scaffold. It looks like there are two companies that will do 50-100kb assemblies as a service today, but I guarantee you they're going to look at what you're trying to make, and who is asking them to do it.

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estearum 42 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

https://www.genewiz.com/public/services/gene-synthesis/custo...

There you go!

Steps from your mailbox to an actual virus is a few days of bench work.

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timr 34 minutes ago | parent [-]

Yes, that's one of the ones I was talking about.

That's not a service that makes you a virus, and making one from an mRNA transcript is not trivial.

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estearum 21 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Here let's just get specific.

For each of the years below, what is YOUR estimate for how long would it take a person of 80th percentile intelligence with $10,000,000 (2026 money) to get from "I'd like to kill a lot of people" to a working virus?

You can provide a range for each if you'd like.

In the year 1800 – how long?

1950?

2020?

2026?

2050?

2200?

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smallmancontrov 23 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

And one wouldn't make one from mRNA. This guy doesn't know what he's talking about. Still: the difficulty isn't comparable to EUV machines or refining uranium and does not form a comfortable security barrier.

	▲	timr 14 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		I generally agree -- the actual risk is from serious/state actors, and for those, the barriers are not high. I'm just saying that people are focused on the wrong problem because they've got LLM-brain.

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rbliss an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

Yet.

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timr 35 minutes ago | parent [-]

No, the sophomoric LLM argument does not apply here. The world is not a big computer.

The point is that the rate-limiting step in producing something infective is a couple million dollars in special lab equipment, skilled practitioners, and incredibly tricky and tedious procedures that take time and repetition to master.

So yeah, you can try to pay someone who has that expertise to make your top-sekret superbug (good luck with that), or you can do what any real threat actor is going to do, and put in the time and investment. That's the hard part, not asking ChatGPT for a genome sequence.

Let me put it another way: despite the synthesis pathways for many common illegal drugs being widely known and trivial enough that an undergrad O-chem major could do them, in fact doing this is a very good way to get caught and arrested. And that's easy.

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estearum 31 minutes ago | parent [-]

Your example of how easy it is to control outputs behind specialized knowledge is a thing (recreational drugs) that exist in mass quantities every place on the planet at consumer-accessible prices?

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timr 18 minutes ago | parent [-]

No. My argument is that many things in the world are hard in a way that computers cannot solve, and the existence of LLMs does not change that.

Synthetic biology is one of those things.

	▲	estearum 11 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Uhhh right... but all the other hard parts are being solved too, correct? LLMs are clearly going to solve a part that, 10 years ago, one would've assumed would be one of the highest and last barriers to go down. Without LLMs, a reasonable security apparatus would be: Step 1. Disallow dissemination and synthesis of known pathogens Step 2. Watch closely anyone with the decades of training required to come up with their own pathogen