I feel like prompt armor writes the exact same blog post for every agentic tool because they all suffer from the ignore previous instructions prompt injections.

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/claude-cowork-exfiltra...

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/google-antigravity-exf...

https://promptarmor.substack.com/p/data-exfiltration-from-sl...

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/gpt-for-google-sheets-...

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/notion-ai-unpatched-da...

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/ramps-sheets-ai-exfilt...

https://www.promptarmor.com/resources/superhuman-ai-exfiltra...

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nemomarx an hour ago | parent [-]

How could they not? If some lab had a method to make really secure guard rails or avoid prompt injection thoroughly I think they would be trumpeting it. But the basic mechanics of language models are vulnerable to this unless you can always be sure the inputs are from a safe user imo

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PokestarFan 16 minutes ago | parent [-]

If you want AI to be useful it will eventually encounter untrusted content, such as via web search. I think things like web search should probably be run on a different sandboxed AI whose task is to write a summary that is then ingested by the main agent, similar to how existing sandboxing already works, but this would diminish the usefulness quite a bit.

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savanaly 14 minutes ago | parent [-]

>I think things like web search should probably be run on a different sandboxed AI whose task is to write a summary that is then ingested by the main agent, similar to how existing sandboxing already works, but this would diminish the usefulness quite a bit.

It also wouldn't work. You would simply mindjack the outer AI and have it mindjack the inner AI in turn with its summary. Nesting AIs can't fix the malicious input problem.

	▲	santadays 10 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Just pass that through a third llm.