Boy I’m so tired of people trying to make clever attack names. They don’t help remember things, there are too many.

So all 3 “pass-ta-key” attacks are not attacks on passkeys, they’re attacks on the Google vault.

And if you get access to the vault, then you get everything. OK. And if you get access to a synced traditional password vault, then you get everything.

So… meh. These are bugs, they will be fixed. Good on them for disclosing them. But this does not prove that passkeys are terrible. This does not make them less secure than random passwords.

If it wasn’t for the fact that they just happen to be getting passkeys, seems like this wouldn’t be worth a headline or discussing at all. And if they have this level of access, then they also get all the standard password credentials in the vault too, right?

These are endpoint malware attacks, not attacks on Passkeys per se. This is already a game-over position for an attacker to be in.

>4. Using the hash of that handshake, the attacker interacts with the victim’s TPM and uses the extracted identity key to sign the handshake hash together with the assertion request

Huh? If you have this level of local privileges you can just read session cookies from the browsers store? I guess stealing all the keys is notable, but you can manipulate any password manager with this level of access right?

What's the threat model here, that synced passkeys should be secure in even in situations involving compromised clients? How?

It is hard to find the content for all of the glitzy ads on this site.

"You must enable DRM to play some audio or video on this page" pops up in the strangest places...