Just as the amplitudes program suggests that spacetime itself may be an emergent structure rather than the fundamental substrate of reality [1], the computational theory of mind may be mistaking an emergent representation for the source of consciousness. A more fundamental theory must therefore treat neural computation as an emergent interface within conscious-agent relations, rather than as the mechanism that generates consciousness.

Even the loosest, "multiply realizable" version of computationalism this entry lays out still needs something physical to run on like neurons, silicon, spacetime, whatever. Problem is, natural selection was never selecting for accurate perception of that substrate, just for fitness payoffs [2].

So computationalism has the order backwards: you can't generate a mind by computing over a brain when the brain, like any object in spacetime, is just a species-specific icon evolution gave you to see, not the hardware underneath it.

[1] https://vod.video.cornell.edu/media/1_sfv907qp

[2] https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4060643

I can prove things are the way they are outside my mind's perception of them, through the use of extra sensory devices.

Even in a Donald Hoffman esque icon:hardware situation - and I think he said - "I don't take the icon literally, but I do take it seriously" meaning that even though it's an illusion, it still performs the function, I have trouble with mind preceding matter.

It's the same trouble I have with human-like intelligence preceding worlds.

People come out of worlds, not the other way around.