(Tailscale CEO) You have posted here multiple times that "none of the code has had a security audit" and that the SOC2 audit "is not the same thing."

It's true that those two audits aren't the same thing. However, the SOC2 auditor confirms, in the published report, that Tailscale has regular and ongoing security audits including penetration tests and many kinds of code reviews.

The security audit report, which you perhaps imagine to be a long list of vulnerabilities... doesn't look like that. It says we don't have a long list of vulnerabilities. The security bulletins are all here: https://tailscale.com/security-bulletins

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traceroute66 an hour ago | parent | next [-]

The majority of your security bulletins are as the result of third-party reports to you.

Which, by definition, means they are not done by you, which means you don't know when they will be done or how much of your code base they are looking at.

I think you know full well what I mean by a security audit. If you don't, go look at, for example, the ones that Mullvad publish for their software https://mullvad.net/en/blog/tag/audits.

Please do not try to portray SOC2 as being the same thing as a code audit.

And IF you have regular code audits, then please publish suitably redacted reports in public on your website. Just like everyone else does !

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apenwarr 40 minutes ago | parent [-]

(Tailscale CEO) I don't know what to tell you. The problems that are found internally, or via security reviews and pentests we pay for, are ones that we fix before releasing. They don't need bulletins.

Bugs that are found by other people are found, by definition, after release. They are therefore more likely to need a bulletin.

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traceroute66 36 minutes ago | parent [-]

But why should insecure argument handling bugs (as per your recent SSH bulletin) be found after release ?

Those are an ancient class of bugs that should be picked up by any competent security review.

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apenwarr 32 minutes ago | parent [-]

Is your theory that "any competent security review" will find every security hole in a product? Because that sure would be great if it were true. Unfortunately it does not match my experience.

	▲	traceroute66 19 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Every security hole ? No, of course not. But things like insecure argument handling are low-hanging fruit for security auditors. Insecure argument handling is not like the more advanced subtle vulnerabilities that we are seeing in some LLM-assisted reports these days. Insecure argument handling is 1990's security. The fundamental problem remains that Tailscale has too many new "features" being added to it the whole time. New features means a whole bunch new code. Which increases bloat and exponentially increases the attack surface. It would be really nice if you could stop shoehorning in every new feature you can think of. Remove some of the existing ones that don't really need to be there. And get your codebase back to a more focused state, get back to your roots as a VPN product. Stop trying to be all things to all men, as the old saying goes.

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r0b05 41 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-]

That link is a list of incidents while the parent comment is referring to security audits of the code.

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maxgashkov 23 minutes ago | parent | prev [-]

<s>Read</s> Skimmed the report (and cheers for not gating it behind request-to-obtain) and I'm a bit surprised to not see any mentions of pentests which I'd expect given the large surface you host. What gives?