Sadly the article doesn't really touch on whether or not DMARC accomplishes anything truly useful. When I enabled DMARC for ingress email on one of my own mail servers, it ultimately ended up regularly blocking a handful emails from customers, yet virtually all the spam coming in had valid SPF / DKIM / DMARC, as do most of the phishing attacks.

The core problem is that the real need of email end users need is a way of determining whether or not to trust a given sender. Signatures are purely a technical measure which provides no information on the trustworthiness of the sender. The end result is that email scoring still has to be content based, and the signature check technologies are pure noise with no useful signal for the purpose of determining if an email should actually show up in my inbox.

The tech industry has a bad habit of providing solutions to problems adjacent to problems the user actually needs solved while leaving the user's actual problem unresolved.

> The core problem is that the real need of email end users need is a way of determining whether or not to trust a given sender.

Which is only the core problem because dmarc fixed the other core problem of figuring out who the given sender is.

DMARC does not solve everything, but it does make other solutions more effective.

> virtually all the spam coming in had valid SPF / DKIM / DMARC, as do most of the phishing attacks.

This should create a means to go after the domain owners via registrar and trail of ownership, even so far as blocking email from the domain.

Forcing the spammers to pass DMARC creates a burden and an evidence trail that didn't exist before.

The primary purpose of DMARC is to prevent impersonation not to prevent spam. I own a domain, I implement DMARC to make sure others know when email from my domain is legitimately from my domain.

> The tech industry has a bad habit of providing solutions to problems adjacent to problems the user actually needs solved while leaving the user's actual problem unresolved.

Extremely well said.

My domain is very low traffic but, I just looked through my admin email account and opendmarc has rejected 18 attempts by spammers just this past week. More were rejected by my domain's DMARC policy.

My work email is Outlook, which is horribly broken and terrible to use. I have a rule configured to "re-send" all my mail to a different account where I read it with a usable MUA. Unfortunately this seems to break DMARC for external mail as now an email from e.g. user@example.com appears to have been sent by outlook.com.

^ this

Additionally, I would probably guess correctly that almost all spam comes from rotating ASNs these days. Aka from companies that do "growth marketing" or other bullshit that isn't a valid business but just... spamming people.

A lot of the domains that fall through the cracks for single-spam-campaigns have been taken over by botnet campaigns, so the actual owners of said domains probably don't know that their website is spamming everyone else.

But the major providers are the culprit, too, here. Gmail, hotmail, microsoft o365, mailgun ... they all don't even enforce SSL from server to server, and let through "sendmail" like spam because the spammers are paying customers to them.

Source: I am maintaining antispam [1] which I am using to combat spam, phishing, and malware campaigns targeting my customer networks.

[1] https://github.com/cookiengineer/antispam