De facto ban on capable open-weight models doesn't seem inconsistent with Dario's statement to me. One, it is de facto, not de jure, and it can and will change as AI alignment research advances. Two, it is only capable open-weight models, not open-weight models. In fact, Dario says non-dangerous (which for now is mostly non-capable) open-weight models are a public good, and I agree.

▲

verdverm 5 hours ago | parent [-]

How do we define "capable"?

Is Kimi K3 capable? It's already out and being run by US companies on US hardware in US data centers.

https://huggingface.co/moonshotai/Kimi-K3

▲

sanxiyn 4 hours ago | parent [-]

That is a difficult question I am not qualified to answer, but Mythos 5 was export controlled for a brief time due to its cybersecurity capability and implications to national security, so for cybersecurity "as capable as Mythos 5" seems to be a good baseline. I wouldn't know for biosecurity though.

UK AISI preliminary evaluation suggests Kimi K3 is not capable enough for cybersecurity in this sense.

https://www.aisi.gov.uk/blog/preliminary-assessment-of-kimi-...

	▲	verdverm 4 hours ago \| parent [-]
		I would be hesitant to extrapolate from this analysis https://exploitbench.ai/#honest-limits