| ▲ | microtonal 6 hours ago |
| I am generally in favor of security improvements, but I do not really see much of a benefit here. This attack vector requires both that the user enabled developer settings and that they have remote adb enabled. So, this does not seem to be a realistic attack vector for 99.9% of the users and most of the other 0.1% probably know what they are doing. The other proposed change (to restrict access to certain interfaces or IP addresses) seems good, but why not allow developers to restrict access localhost? It reeks of trying to block Shizuku, Canta, etc. using a way that only makes it look like a side-effect. |
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| ▲ | m132 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] |
| > This attack vector requires both that the user enabled developer settings and that they have remote adb enabled. Not just that. A non-development Android build will also prompt the user when a connection is made to authorize the client's key. This once again isn't about security of users, this is about security of the company's interests. |
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| ▲ | lucideer 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| This. I'm a developer, I've published Android apps, & I've still managed to lose access to a device that had dev settings enabled purely because remote adb enablement is a (extremely fiddly) toggle that happened to be off on the device at the time the screen broke. Having these two enabled simultaneously is such a rare case in the wild as to be entirely negligible as a vector. |
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| ▲ | wahnfrieden an hour ago | parent [-] | | Sometimes attacks happen from users being instructed to enable settings in order to achieve something regardless of whether you’d expect them to have a reason to use the setting | | |
| ▲ | atty an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Sure, sometimes people get social engineered into taking money from their bank account and giving it to criminals. Should banks stop allowing withdrawals? | |
| ▲ | tyromaniac 27 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | If someone is willing to click on build version 5 times and then gets a mystery prompt about dev mode, and still goes along with the next 4 steps I think they were gonna get hacked a billion different other ways | |
| ▲ | Hizonner 28 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | ... and it is stupid to try to protect cretins who would do that by screwing everybody else. |
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| ▲ | pigggg 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| Isn't this because of the kimwolf (and now 6+ other botnets) that are taking advantage of people running residential proxyware unknowingly on the device which permits outbound connections to 127.0.0.1 on tcp/5555 to auth in and exec wgets or drops a loader that grabs the ddos malware APKs and install it? |
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| ▲ | crote 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | It seems to require the user to: 1. Enable Developer Mode by going to an obscure settings page and tapping the build number seven times 2. Enable USB ADB debugging in the Developer Options 3. Establish an actual USB ADB session 4. Enable TCP/IP ADB debugging in the Developer Options 5. Unknowingly download a malware app from the official Play Store 6. Blindly click "Yes" on the permission prompt. In other words: this is all but impossible to impact regular users, and it requires a particularly careless developer to be hit by it. And it only works if the Play Store is useless at preventing malware in the first place - but I thought their excellent app scanning was the entire reasoning behind all-but-banning 3rd-party app stores and sideloading??? It is "for safety" in the same sense that governments banning all encryption is to "protect the children" or to "prevent terrorism": flawed justification invented to distract from the real reason they want it. | | |
| ▲ | ryandrake 18 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | I think expert users on HN seriously downplay the ability and willingness of "regular users" to do very stupid things on their devices. If grandma wants that app that gives her a beautiful horse as a lock screen image, she will follow every one of those six steps that the malware HorseLockScreen app developer presents to her. She will tap a button that has a skull and crossbones icon, that says "tapping this will drain your bank account and kill your dog" if she thinks it will let her do whatever she's trying to do on her device. Have you guys never done IT tech support for your elderly parents' computers? I'm not saying it's right to respond by simply locking everything down, but let's not downplay the blast radius of basically every attack that involves telling the user to do things. | |
| ▲ | 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | II2II 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | > In other words: this is all but impossible to impact regular users, and it requires a particularly careless developer to be hit by it. Have you ever worked with someone who barely knows how to use a mobile phone? They will hand their phone over to someone they barely even know to do something they don't understand. They will follow instructions from a stranger over the phone, without understanding what the phone is warning them about. I have worked with such a person. They did have someone walk them through a dubious process. Thankfully they realized what was going on before the process was complete, but who knows how much damage was done by the initial steps. There are legitimate security reasons here. Whether there are reasons beyond that is an open question. | | |
| ▲ | freedomben an hour ago | parent | next [-] | | Following this logic, shouldn't we just ban smart phones for everyone then? If we need to dumb down all technology to the absolute lowest level, we should probably ban computers or at least require an official government-controlled license to get access to one. Is this a world you want to live in? Me neither. | |
| ▲ | realusername an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You are right, better locking them out of the Play Store, there's too much risk using it. We could also imagine a 24h delay to get Play Store access | |
| ▲ | oblio 19 minutes ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Those people will be conned in a million other ways. | |
| ▲ | g-b-r 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Can we freaking sell them dumbphones, then, and stop destroying portable computers for everyone else with that excuse? Which incidentally is often just a pretense for other motives? If computers have suddenly become so dangerous for normal people, and they want smartphones nonetheless, add to them a dumb-mode encouraged at the initial setup, and requiring some third party assistance to turn it off once enabled..! (and forbid apps to change their behavior if it's not enabled) | | |
| ▲ | mlrtime 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | "Can we freaking sell them dumbphones" Nothing is stopping the guy at Walmart or Tmobile from selling them dumbphones, or are you implying they are forced to? | | |
| ▲ | RunSet an hour ago | parent [-] | | Try letting the blame trickle down from the pyramid's apex instead of blaming the footman. Here is the first iPhone ad: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Bvfs4ai5XU The ad depicts it as a mere phone instead of a potentially hostile Turing machine. There is equivalent messaging in the android ecosystem but its advertising is not so ubiquitous. |
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| ▲ | franga2000 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You haven't been able to connect to an android device on port 5555 for yeeears. Every time you enable adb/IP it generates a new random port, or you need to use the QR/PIN pairing thing. On top of needing to enable developer options, adb/IP, confirm the fingerprint. | | |
| ▲ | pigggg 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Millions of Superboxes and various digital picture frames say different. https://synthient.com/blog/a-broken-system-fueling-botnets | | |
| ▲ | microtonal 2 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Kimwolf exploits vulnerable Android Debug Bridge (ADB) services. Many low-cost TV boxes come "pre-infected" with proxy SDKs; Kimwolf then scans these residential proxy networks and exploits the devices within minutes as it propagates. https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/glossary/aisuru-kim... This is like saying that SSH is insecure because some device vendors install SSH, permitting root login with a default password of 'root'. | | | |
| ▲ | franga2000 an hour ago | parent | prev [-] | | Well yes, but those won't get Google's new updates either. Open ADB on 5555 was a problem we solved almost a decade ago and these devices are still vulnerable. Even further restricting ADB in the latest version won't do anything to prevent that. |
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| ▲ | xg15 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Hadn't thought about that additional attack vector those proxies are enabling. In addition to "internet access from residental connection" privileges, the attacker also gets access to loopback on the device that does the proxying... But even then, shouldn't this show the same permission prompt for the user that anything else trying to connect to port 5555 would? | | |
| ▲ | londons_explore 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, but users are told to allow it if they want to get free coins etc. | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | You can't fully protect people from the risk of taking bad advice from malicious strangers. Not the least because most of our industry relies on it to make money. Marketing and advertising themselves are institutionalized forms of "do this thing that's actually harmful to you to get free coins / be safe / get laid". | | |
| ▲ | xg15 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Not the least because most of our industry relies on it to make money. I mean, this seems more like one of the root causes for a lot of bad things in the industry me... |
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| ▲ | xg15 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Told by whom though? If it's through proxyware, then there are three parties who mostly don't know each other: - the app embedding the proxyware SDK for money - the proxy operators - the attackers/botnets using the proxy to access ADB. The botnet has no access to the app, so it can't show any messages. The app can show messages, but probably has no connection to the botnet. (I hope) The proxy operators could show a message by abusing the SDK even more, but that would mean they actively colluded with the botnet. Is that likely? Then they could just give the botnet direct access to the app, no need to do the whole proxy thing. | | |
| ▲ | londons_explore 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | It isn't being done behind-the-back of proxy operators. It's one more revenue stream to be able to remote control real android phones to pass device attestation checks etc. It's marketed to users with phrases like "earn money from your phone whilst you sleep". | | |
| ▲ | xg15 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Ok, that makes more sense. Hooray for stuff getting even worse... | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Remote attestation itself being a questionable idea at best, so it's bad things creating a market for even worse workarounds. | | |
| ▲ | xg15 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | No objection there. Also telling that advertising and locking down devices are driven by the same companies... |
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| ▲ | PunchyHamster 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] |
| It's not because of security. It's to slowly close any avenues for side-loading stuff |
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| ▲ | miroljub an hour ago | parent [-] | | It's not side loading. Word you are looking for is called "installing". |
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| ▲ | izacus 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] |
| The bug literally describes how they're avoiding OS security restictions by going through the debug port. This is a CVE by any definition and you'd be screaming your head off if any other OS would allow this kind of permission bypass (or even if another app did it). But sure, Google evil. |
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| ▲ | subscribed 34 minutes ago | parent | next [-] | | There's a vulnerability in my bike - when I push my left handlebar hard forward when riding down a road, I can crash into a pillar. I think a possibility of knowingly pushing the handlebar should be removed from me, just in case. After all I could do it. And while we're at it I just realised my car has a similar vulnerability, but triggered by a slightly different mechanism, but the effect is exactly the same, I can crash into a pillar. Edit: oops, I just discovered that if I have a banking app installed on my phone, then tap my screen in the specific places, enter several numbers, including the number I receive in text, suddenly I lose all the money. That's staggering! | |
| ▲ | gnfargbl 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | You, and may of the people in the thread here are at cross purposes, I think. The CVE mentioned in the article is https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0073. That's a real CVE: logic error leading to auth bypass. Fix can be seen at https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/a.... Separately, a number of people here are attempting to argue that the availability of On-Device ADB should be regarded as a "CVE" in and of itself. Google does not appear to share that view. | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | > Separately, a number of people here are attempting to argue that the availability of On-Device ADB should be regarded as a "CVE" in and of itself. Google does not appear to share that view. This was proposed by a Google employee: https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment3 | | |
| ▲ | gnfargbl 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | That link is mentioned in the article. To quote it: > Connection to localhost has also been the source of exploit where app are using that socket to adbd to escalate their privileges. What about we restrict to always only binding to wifi interface wlan0 ? Nowhere in that text do I see a proposal to assign an additional CVE for this behaviour. Personally I think it would be unusual to assign a CVE for intended-but-potentially-harmful functionality, although I expect people have done that in the past. But, I think overall we're agreeing here. | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yeah, they didn't claim that it's a CVE, just behavior that they wanted to change. Miscommunication then. |
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| ▲ | TeMPOraL 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | > This is a CVE by any definition and you'd be screaming your head off if any other OS would allow this kind of permission bypass. Or perhaps they wouldn't? CVEs aren't holy scripture, and "security" isn't the most important consideration in computing. This theatre has gone too far IMO. | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Allowing strangers to run adb commands on your phone without your consent is about as bad as a compromise can get. Your keyboard can be replaced with a keylogger and all of your data can be stolen without your knowledge by simply connecting to the wrong wifi network. | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | Yes, but what about allowing me to run adb commands on my phone with my consent, and especially delegating that privilege to "strangers", again, with my (one-time) consent - by which I mean authorizing apps to run with elevated privileges and/or reestablish the debugging bridge once it invariably disconnects (for other more or less legitimate security reasons)? It's not like those threats silently turn on ADB on people's phones without their knowledge. You have to opt in to a rather obscure, hidden by default, and very fickle feature to become potentially vulnerable in the first place. | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 4 hours ago | parent [-] | | They're 3 separate issues. There's a genuine vulnerability (CVE) which has been fixed, there's a follow-up proposal to allow the user to choose which interfaces to bind to, and there's another proposal to disallow ADB over loopback which would cut you off from using ADB on-device. Your problem is with the last one which has nothing to do with the CVE itself. | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 3 hours ago | parent [-] | | Correct. That, and security maximalism displayed in 3. and some comments in the HN thread. |
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| ▲ | theplumber 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Depends how you define a CVE. If owning and controlling your device is a CVE/bug then sure you need a tight box with anti tempering as well. | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Can you provide a reasonable definition where an authentication bypass in ADB doesn't qualify as a vulnerability? Is there a use case for allowing anyone on your network to run adb commands without your approval? There are 3 things which I feel like are being confused here: 1. There was a genuine authentication bypass vulnerability in ADB (bad) 2. Initial proposed change wants to add an option to limit the ADB server to certain IPs or network interfaces (good - it doesn't affect you) 3. Response to the original request, proposing that ADB shouldn't be allowed to listen on loopback interfaces (bad/nefarious - it breaks functionality) [1] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0073 [2] https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment1 [3] https://issuetracker.google.com/issues/526109803#comment3 | |
| ▲ | 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | [deleted] | |
| ▲ | izacus 5 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | "An app can bypass OS security system with certain setting enabled" absolutely fits into CVEs. There's no "depends: on it. I love how quickly you all forget about security and privacy when it gives a chance to angrily rant. | | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 5 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | Anything can fit into CVE. "An app can bypass OS security system with certain setting enabled" is absolutely a valid CVE. We have countless examples every day of vendor apps bypassing OS security systems because they're allowed to do so. "A device can bypass protective layers and cause soft tissue damage when thrown" is an absolutely fine CVE, too. Whether it matters or is something that should be addressed, is the depends part. Here we're talking about CVE that's at risk of trying to address a feature. You are forgetting the most important questions of security, without which the whole discussion becomes pointless: Who is securing what, and from who? CVEs seem much less like holy writ when they're aimed at protecting the device for commercial interests and from the device owner. | | |
| ▲ | izacus 2 hours ago | parent [-] | | Apps being able to bypass a restriction put on them by the OS always matter. Whether that means there's a _feature_ lacking there, is another question. |
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| ▲ | vrighter 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | a lot of cves are of the type "if you leave the keys in the door, then anyone can unlock it and get in! We must destroy all doors, they are insecure!" This is one of them | | |
| ▲ | dns_snek 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | This is not one of them. This is "the lock accepts any key" type of CVE. > In adbd_tls_verify_cert of auth.cpp, there is a possible bypass of wireless ADB mutual authentication due to a logic error in the code. This could lead to remote (proximal/adjacent) code execution as the shell user with no additional execution privileges needed. Patch: https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/a... Docs: > EVP_PKEY_cmp() return 1 if the keys match, 0 if they don't match, -1 if the key types are different and -2 if the operation is not supported. The original code cast the integer return value to boolean, and -1 and -2 cast to "true", therefore authentication would succeed if the key types were different or the operation wasn't supported. | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | You jest, but passkeys seem to have literally been invented to address something like: "Keys to your doors can be used by anyone to open those doors, regardless of your knowledge or presence". Which is a problem only if the third party acquired those keys without your permission, but the industry decided to "fix it" regardless. |
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| ▲ | rcxdude 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | When half that security is aimed against the user it's pretty easy to cheer for cracks in it. | |
| ▲ | J-Kuhn 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I changed the sudo settings to not require a password. Now an application on my computer can obtain root without user interaction. Where is my CVE? | |
| ▲ | crote 4 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | Sounds like the Settings panel is a CVE, we should immediately get rid of it. And don't forget the Play Store! |
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| ▲ | 3form 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Because you know, the actual solution would be to have more granularity in authentication process than "allow whole device to attach to ADB", but that would be like, difficult... so they're not going to so that. Right now any app on my PC connected to ADB could manipulate my phone then, and that's somehow not a CVE? | | |
| ▲ | dminik 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | Is it a CVE that an app running on my PC could actually be running under GDB? It's the entire purpose of these tools. |
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| ▲ | roer 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | The original issue is proposing letting the user assign the debug service to a specific interface, one of which would presumably be loopback. This article is about the proposal from a developer that it should only ever be assigned to wlan0, which would break a lot of apps. Letting applications bypass permissions with this feature is the exact usecase they don't want to lose. If anything, I don't see them being against the original proposal possibly restricting non-loopback access, which would enhance security. | | |
| ▲ | izacus 5 hours ago | parent [-] | | It would break exactly 0 apps because none of the apps should be using this API to access your private data and phone call audio. | | |
| ▲ | microtonal 4 hours ago | parent | next [-] | | So why do Google Play Services, etc. have full privileged access to a phone, including private data and phone call audio, but the user doesn't? It is tech feudalism - you don't own anything anymore, you just get to live on the digital land of a bunch of ~trillion dollar companies. At least, that is the goal. IMO either everyone gets access at the user's discretion or Google has to sandbox their own GMS services as well. | |
| ▲ | TeMPOraL 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Why? What other APIs should my apps (or the apps I explicitly want to authorize for this purpose) use to access my private data and my phone call audio? | |
| ▲ | subscribed 38 minutes ago | parent | prev [-] | | So what official API call recorder app can use? |
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| ▲ | spaqin 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | In this case, the OS security restrictions should be questioned in the first place as excessive if a "backdoor" is necessary for normal function. | |
| ▲ | microtonal 4 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | I am not sure I follow. Are you referring to the original CVE (?), I fully agree that it should be fixed, and it is not what my comment was about. If you are talking about allowing listening on localhost - remote ADB requires enabling in the developer settings. It is a developer feature, similar to ADB over USB. If I'm charitable, it is possible that they are seeing too many people that are using Shizuku without understanding the security implications. But Shizuku has a lot of useful applications and they use ADB because the Android APIs and permission system are lacking and do not make these applications possible. | |
| ▲ | yyhhsj0521 an hour ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | New CVE found in Bank of America app that may cause user to transfer money to hackers if they press certain combination of keys. | | |
| ▲ | phoghed an hour ago | parent [-] | | More like if you have some settings enabled someone on your network can do it for you without your permission |
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| ▲ | zmmmmm 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | Even if you have to deliberately enable a setting and enter a pairing code? It's like saying that the fact the user knows their own password is a vulnerability because they might enter it to log into their account. | |
| ▲ | mrsssnake 5 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-] | | "...avoiding OS security restictions by going through the debug port..." the user delibretry opened and paired to app with clear visual confirmation in order to use it. | |
| ▲ | redeeman 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-] | | no, its a cve if the app can just do it automatically, it is NOT a cve that user goes through 5 steps that they very explicitly do, including unlocking hidden menus to open up developer options, and then allow it. seriously, get real, please explain how your train of thought works here |
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