> they also clearly failed to contract specialists like myself to advise them on how to airgap software properly

Why would they want to airgap it though? They are trying to evaluate the model capabilities, alignment, potency etc. A model which will not run in an airgapped environment in prod.

So if you run your evals in airgapped environment, sure, the model doesn't bother breaking out of it's isolation and doesn't attack HF. But you have no idea what will happen once you release it in prod with internet connection, so are you in any way better off?

I would much rather have this happen while there is a single instance of the model running in a fairly well monitored environment, than when it's processing thousands of requests per second for real users, some with dubious motives, some with credentials right there on their laptop, some using it inside government facilities etc.

Do you think it's possible that one of their research engineers deployed an environment with a locked down network and an allow-list proxy server that had been used many times before within the company and had a zero-day vulnerability that had not been previously discovered?

How would you recommend running a coding agent in an environment that could install packages from PyPI but was otherwise unable to interact with the wider world?

They didn't have watchdog agents - those exist for their production models but had been deliberately removed for the purpose of this evaluation.

OpenAI wrote about how their mechanism for that in production works here: https://openai.com/index/safety-alignment-long-horizon-model...

> We created a monitoring system that reviews the model’s evolving trajectory for signs that it is bypassing a user constraint or safety boundary. The monitor observes not just a single action but the entire trajectory.

Stuxnet misconfigured industrial equipment that was already set up to run, and all it did was break that equipment. This scenario sets a much, much higher bar.

> OpenAI marketing material

This was reported 1 week before by huggingface. It was in no way PR-ish or marketing friendly to the closed labs. They said, in no uncertain terms, that they couldn't use the paid APIs to properly assess the intrusion, as they were blocked when trying to send logs and IoCs to these paid models. They made a point of saying that they had to use open models running on-prem.

Whatever oAI might have said about the incident, and their PR spin bs, the facts here are not in contention. This is not a marketing stunt in any way. Stop "parroting" this every time something happens. It gets stale.

"As reported" includes a line I think most people are overlooking: "including using stolen credentials".

Without more information I'm inclined to think it found something on the internet (which shouldn't be a surprise to anyone) and managed to log in, rather than hack in, and they might by hyping up parts of this.

More likely that a person did that, with a use of LLM.

In the parent's comment I initially read "PR" as "Public Relations" not problem report since their comment is about OpenAI and does not directly accuse Hugging Face except for that phrase. But it's still amiguous to me who's PR they are actually talking about. A good faith reading given the rest of the comment leads me to assume they are talking about OpenAI, not Higgins Face.

I did actually search Hugging Face with police in quotes and found no articles containg the word police but that might be a ddg thing. Then I checked Hugging Face's report and they specifically use the term "law enforcement" not police, as is to be expected I guess. So that checks out.

Can you find any info on the police investigation by the way? At the least, OpenAI should be investigated for potential criminal negligence, right?

Right?

What does calling the police prove? (nothing i hope)