Importantly, anyone can get SOC2 (Type 1) by claiming some controls they figure they'll look at themselves.

SOC2 (Type 2) in theory requires an audit that you're actually doing what you said you'd do in (Type 1).

Both may also allow general lag time.

Note that firms decide on their own which controls to include, meaning, they get to decide to include or exclude various controls, the audit is on only the ones they picked. Pick basic controls, it's cheaper to pass easily, and now you have a logo.

This means SOC2s of either type cannot be compared to one another (and SOC2 Type 1 are roughly logo-ware).

SOC3 is, roughly, SOC2 redacted.

Recap:

SOC2 Type 1 is a firm picking some controls to say they'll do them, SOC2 Type 2 is roughly a firm having someone look at whether they're doing that (warning, screenshots might suffice, audit verification is probably not what you think), and SOC3 is public or non-confidential water down of that, typically without findings.

The only thing that matters is what controls, specifically, they're actually audited on. So ideally you want to know what the controls they picked are, and that a SOC2 Type 2 was audited on those.

Btw, keep in mind that "end to end encryption" means "https" and most controls have similarly basic ways of achieving them. It's difficult to fail SOC2 Type 2 core controls if you know "don't be useless" is how you pass them.

Also, it's not $50K even through the big five DIY SOC2 Type 2 shops. You can use the same ones trillion dollar firms use, by signing up online, and you'll be surprised how inexpensive relative to the cost of failing to let a business check that box in their procurement process.

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tptacek 18 minutes ago | parent | next [-]

Literally any firm can get a SOC2 Type 1, because there's no lookback to it; the Type 1 is a pinky swear.

In practice, if you're careful about how you do your Type 1, the Type 2 is almost as trivial. Your HR/bizops practice is much more likely to screw up and cause exceptions than anything you do in IT or engineering.

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FinnKuhn 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I think companies like Deel showed that SOC2 is more show than anything else.

For context, this is how easy it is to get a SOC2: https://deepdelver.substack.com/p/delve-fake-compliance-as-a...

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paulryanrogers 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

Hasn't Deel been run out of business though?

IME SOC2 is still quite involved for any company, especially smaller ones without specialized security personnel.

	▲	FinnKuhn 42 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		Their website is still up, but I have a hunch you can find some other certificate mill that will give you a SOC2 certificate just as easily.

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a-priori an hour ago | parent | prev [-]

A SOC2's quality entirely depends on how much you trust the auditing firm.

Delve used an audit mill they paid to rubber-stamp the cookie-cutter and AI slop reports it authored. I hope it ends up in fraud charges.

But I wouldn't assume that's the case for all SOC2 reports. Any decent auditing firm should be far more rigorous.

	▲	FinnKuhn 35 minutes ago \| parent \| next [-]
		These audits for Apple were done by EY. As a German I remember that they were banned from doing certain audits in Germany until earlier this year due to their involvement in the wirecard scandal. So at least my personal believe that their audits are done rigorously is nonexistent. https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/03/business/wirecard-ey-ban-...
	▲	tptacek 22 minutes ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		Not really. The more expensive the auditor, the more they'll work with you to craft something that will avoid exceptions. There's no real "rigor" involved in SOC2! The "audit" here is in audit in the accounting sense: "do your records square up?". SOC2 auditors are generally not technical people.

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deepsun 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Well you "claiming controls" to an independent CPA auditor. If a licensed CPA helps you lie -- they might lose their license (and can even get to prison), just like a tax preparer CPA can.