if the giga rich pushing this latest ai wave manage to convince a single safety critical industry to deregulate, we are all boned

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wildfireday2 2 days ago | parent [-]

That’s true, however a properly engineered safety-critical system provides separation between assurance levels, so you don’t need to have the same level of assurance for the infotainment system software that you do for safety-critical displays and controls.

The FAA has historically done a good job on this front with aviation (notwithstanding the 747 MAX debacle, which was a failure implicating flight control software but not a failure of separation of assurance levels). Automotive software and standards and NHTSA is far behind on this front. Cost is certainly a factor; it is not economical to apply aviation safety and engineering standards and processes directly to automobiles. But in the meantime, it is an absolute Wild West for any contemporary drive-by-wire car.

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thin_carapace 2 days ago | parent [-]

don't know where you sourced your perspective but yea based on the reports ive heard from automotive engineers, coding in autosar is the direct opposite of wild

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wildfireday2 2 days ago | parent [-]

I have first-hand experience unlike your third-hand anecdotes. AUTOSAR is a private industry consortium that develops specifications. They are voluntary and self-attested and don’t have anything like the verification and documentation processes that are mandated by DO-178 in the aviation world by regulators with both independent engineering certification and regulatory oversight. Tesla and Rivian don’t participate at all. There is no comparable regulatory framework for automotive software—at all. It is purely reactive.

And lest you take issue with my characterization or claim Tesla is a rogue outlier, let me remind you that Volkswagen shipped deliberate software emissions defeat code in 11 million diesel passenger vehicles over eight model years including half a million in the USA, and was only caught by academic researchers.

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RealityVoid 2 days ago | parent | next [-]

> don’t have anything like the verification and documentation processes that are mandated by DO-178

ISO 26262? Not sure how the enforcement looks, but automotive is pretty serious about ISO 26262.

Still, the infotainment is most likely QM so it wouldn't apply in this specific situation.

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wildfireday2 2 days ago | parent [-]

ISO 26262 does have serious lifecycle standards but again it’s a voluntary industry standard that has no government oversight or regulatory authority. Oversight is typically largely internal and is strongest in the auto parts/components market. It’s largely toothless to automakers/integrators and again the likes of Tesla simply don’t use it and have no obligation to.

The infotainment system itself may be QM but there has to be assurance that it is in fact separated from higher safety level system.

	▲	RealityVoid 2 days ago \| parent [-]
		> it’s a voluntary industry standard that has no government oversight or regulatory authority. Yes, hence why I said I'm not sure about enforcement mechanisms how they stack up against the aviation standard. Still, in my limited experience, projects that are ASIL x take the thing pretty seriously and they do get certifications from external bodies. Actually, I am supporting an SEooC external certification right now. > The infotainment system itself may be QM but there has to be assurance that it is in fact separated from higher safety level system. The separation most likely happens _outside_ the infotainment itself, through a gateway.

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2 days ago | parent | prev [-]

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