Regarding Shiva Ayyadurai v. U.S. in particular:

> There are DOZENS of cases applying Section 230(c)(1) to removal decisions, so for the court to think that it’s spotted something that all of those other courts have missed is laughable…and completely gratuitous…and ultimately inconsequential given that the court still tosses the case.

> The court tries to justify its reluctance on Section 230(c)(1):

>> There is little reason to strain the reach of the immunity in Section 230(c)(1) when, as in this case, the immunity in Section 230(c)(2) leads to the same result.

> NOOOO. There are several excellent reasons to apply both 230(c)(1) and 230(c)(2):

> (1) 230(c)(1) doesn’t have a good faith prerequisite, which has mucked up 230(c)(2) jurisprudence and made 12(b)(6) dismissals much more difficult to obtain, jacking up the litigation costs for both sides and giving false hope to bogus claims. Indeed, because the court dismissed this case without prejudice, I’m sure an amended complaint will try again to manufacture bad faith sufficient to kick the case into very expensive discovery;

> (2) removal and leave-up decisions are two sides of the same decision, i.e., every editorial decision about an item of third-party content is either a leave-up or removal decision, so they cannot be separated; and

> (3) the statute and 25+ years of caselaw have established the principle that 230(c)(1) applies to removal decisions.