> In these talks, the EU Parliament is pushing for a paradigm shift in how we approach online child safety, demanding: [..] Strict security standards for messaging apps (“Security by Design”) to prevent cyber grooming.

It's dispiriting to see a supposedly pro-privacy politician launder backdoors as "strict security standards".

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vrganj 6 hours ago | parent [-]

I think they mean local scanning for CSAM - which feels like a reasonable solution that preserves privacy, but still addresses the real problem of, y'know, child abuse?

	▲	simiones 5 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		What is the false positive rate that you would be comfortable with such a scan having? What would be the risk of your personal photos and videos being recognized as CSAM and reported to your local police (and thus being shown to your local police) that you would be happy to accept? Would you also be ok with not being allowed to send any mail unless you first scan the contents of everything in that envelope and include a generated signature that might tell the post office that you're sending CSAM? And then having the envelope delivered directly to police if the scan did indicate that?
	▲	budududuroiu 4 hours ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		If local scanning of CSAM flags a post, that post will have to be analysed by a human operator. If you send a sensitive photo of your kid's rash to your spouse, and it gets flagged, are you ok with a random cyber enforcement officer seeing your child in that way?
	▲	u8080 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		Okay, since it is already working system - how could I verify it scans for CSAM, not my dissident books and saved eps*ein files?
	▲	ibejoeb an hour ago \| parent \| prev \| next [-]
		I have a question: who trains the CSAM model?
	▲	like_any_other 5 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		Weaponizing our own property against us, mandating that it spies and tattles on us, turning inanimate objects into policemen to construct the most total surveillance dystopia, is not in any way "reasonable". In no way does it "preserve privacy". And let's not pretend there are not already many other ways in which child abuse is detected and fought. When schoolteachers or doctors or neighbors or other family members notice something is amiss, when a CSAM group is infiltrated by police, or when a predator falls for a honeypot. This triggers an investigation, and at that point no digital lock can withstand modern targeted covert surveillance. But we are supposed to pretend none of this exists, and that encryption is an unassailable castle, and play along with the "going dark" lie, despite being more surveilled than at literally any point in history, including under the Stasi. They only don't address child abuse, if by "child abuse" is meant a photo existing in some private shared-with-nobody hard drive, and not an actual human child being abused.