It would be a nice addition if big tech didn't abuse this to shove user-hostile software into devices which the user has paid for (like smartphones).. thanks to this attitude, whenever I see "remote attestation" I associate this with "hostile"..

> Using a TPM, we can remotely, cryptographically prove a couple of things:

Unless there are exploits..

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lcvw 4 hours ago | parent [-]

I mean, all tech can be used in different ways. My experience has been much more on the preventing root kits side, rather then vendor lock in.

Yes, there can be exploits, but hardware exploits over a restricted interface (TPM2) are significantly rarer then normal software vulns. Everything is about risk mitigation, there is no perfect security.

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GreenVulpine 3 hours ago | parent [-]

Make no mistake. Shoving user-hostile malware down people's throats is the primary use case for this in the consumer space. Bootloader malware is very esoteric right now. Enterprise might have valid use cases beyond screwing people but none of them make sense for a consumer device.

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mjg59 3 hours ago | parent | next [-]

You say that, and also remote attestation is how Signal knows it's talking to a legitimate SGX enclave running the expected payload

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greyface- 2 hours ago | parent | next [-]

> running the expected payload

SGX does not cryptographically guarantee this. It cryptographically guarantees that the processor contains a legitimate provisioning key signed by Intel. Intel pinky promises that its processor will then only use this provisioning key in certain ways. This promise is essentially unauditable, and previous SGX bugs have shown that Intel isn't really in a position to make it anyway.

	▲	gucci-on-fleek 43 minutes ago \| parent [-]
		You are 100% correct, but this is still mostly fine: without SGX, you need to completely trust Signal, since it could trivially modify the server-side code. But with SGX, you only need to trust that Signal and Intel won't both collude. The most likely attacks on Signal involve trusted insiders or configuration errors, and SGX mostly prevents these, since to exploit it, you'd need to bribe insiders in both Signal and Intel, or find configuration errors in both of their software stacks. Collusion is certainly still possible, but it's much harder to pull off, since it typically requires nation-state-level resources to exploit. Signal does actually have nation-state adversaries, but the vast majority of other software projects don't. (I personally think that remote attestation is the single biggest risk to the free software movement, but I begrudgingly accept that Signal is a very good use case for it.)

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Zak 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

There's some value in that, but Signal's main security proposition is that you don't have to trust the infrastructure. E2EE means even compromised server software can't read message contents.

	▲	gruez an hour ago \| parent [-]
		He's talking about contact discovery, which can't be solved by just slapping e2ee on it

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lcvw 3 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

I definitely want to do a post on confidential computing as well. Super cool stuff.

	▲	throwaway7679 3 hours ago \| parent [-]
		Maybe you could do a post on... remote attestation. That is, the thing that people are actually talking about when they use that term: The means for companies and governments to usurp the ownership of consumer devices.

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mindslight 2 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

Being able to come up with compelling use cases for a technology does not redeem that technology from creating a terrible power imbalance that incentives will mean is inevitably abused. Whenever anyone hears "remote attestation", they should think of the already-pervasive Cloudflare CAPTCHA nagwalls, and then think of those becoming something you can only get past by buying a new computer running a proprietary locked-down OS and browser.

The only way to make remote attestation into a neutral technology is to prohibit privileged keys being loaded (and retained) by device manufacturers. This would make it impossible for arbitrary protocol counterparties to know if their attestation requests are being answered by hardware, or merely emulated in software. This approach is the only way to preserve computing freedom (ie the very concept of protocols that mediate between mutually-untrusting parties) in the presence of this technology.

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Rohansi 2 hours ago | parent | prev | next [-]

> none of them make sense for a consumer device.

One of the valid use cases on consumer devices is video game anti-cheat software. Theoretically remote attestation can enable them to be less invasive.

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lcvw 3 hours ago | parent | prev [-]

I think consumer devices should have opt-outs for sure. But personally I am much more comfortable with myself and my family having fully locked down apple phones then anything else on the market right now, precisely because of how difficult it is to get persistent malware into that ecosystem.

	▲	zb3 2 hours ago \| parent \| next [-]
		Out of curiosity, do you like ads? I assume you don't.. so how would you react if Apple followed Google and prohibited ad blocking apps + removed that capability from web browsers? I'd not be able to put up with that, but more importantly, I'd not want to be in the position where I can't even protest anything because there's no alternative to switch to..
	▲	ls612 3 hours ago \| parent \| prev [-]
		I get this argument and tell my parents (who know nothing about tech) to get iPhones for this reason but as an economist it is obvious to me the political economy equilibrium implications of this technology are an extreme centralization of power. We are one Covid-like crisis/moral panic away from a regime of only government licensed devices with identity and software integrity attestation can use the internet, and the masses will cheer on the prosecution of the tech nerds who try to circumvent it.